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NOTES

AND WHAT OF THE MEEK?: DEVISING A
CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZED DUTY TO PROTECT
THE DISABLED AT STATE RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS
Section 1983 provides a statutory right to a remedy for Fourteenth
Amendment due process violations. The Supreme Court has suggested that
the state only has a duty to protect when an individual is incarcerated,
involuntarily institutionalized, or has other similar restraints of his or her
personal liberty. Based on this, courts generally have found that schools
have no constitutional duty to protect their students against injury from
other students or staff members. Lower courts have struggled with what
constitutes other similar restraints, but have generally been unwilling to find
that a state has a constitutional duty in all but the most egregious situations.
This Note posits that handicapped students at residential schools are in
situations sufficiently similar to incarceration or involuntary institutionalization that the schools should have a constitutional duty to protect these
students. The proposed duty would allow those students least able to protect
themselves an avenue of recovery while preserving the general no-duty rule
in the more universalpublic school settings.
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We do not want to pretend that the line between action and
inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state puts a man in a
position of danger from private persons and then fails to
protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was
merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had
thrown him into a snake pit.'
INTRODUCTION

A curious tension dwells at the heart of the nation's legal and political
sentiments. Today's popular political climate often reverberates with calls
for less federal intrusion into state affairs. The recent retrenchment of affirmative action,' as well as the seemingly perennial twin tirades against the
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (opinion by Posner, J.).
2 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.) (finding that a state university law
school's admissions program violated equal protection rights by giving substantial racial
preferences), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); see also Amy Wallace, UC Regents
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Internal Revenue Service and Big Government, 3 demonstrate a disenchantment with federal involvement in local matters. At the same time, however,
federal intercession has been actively sought out to provide remedies for the
most personal of problems affecting our society. The enactment of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, for example, created a right to civil
damage remedies in federal court for gender-motivated abuse of women,
even when the abuser is not a state actor.4 In the wake of the Supreme
Court's 1992 decision in Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public Schools' to
hold school officials responsible under Title IX6 for the sexual harassment
of students by teachers or other employees, lower courts have begun to
"extend that duty to include harassment of students by other students."7
Hardly curious, then, against the backdrop of these tensions and developments, is the continuing debate over whether schools have a constitutional
duty to protect their students. So far, the general rule has been to relieve
schools of any constitutional duty to protect their students The basis for
this general no-duty rule stands against the great weight of scholarly com-

Refuse to Yield on Affirmative Action Ban, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1996, at Al (discussing
the University of California Board of Regents's refusal to vote on proposals to revive
an admissions policy of race and gender-based preferences).
3 See, e.g., Clay Chandler & Albert B. Crenshaw, Clinton to Propose Board to Act
as IRS Watchdog; National, Local Citizen Panels Envisioned, WASH. POST, Oct. 3,
1997, at Al (discussing congressional and presidential responses to the public's complaints about the Internal Revenue Service); Liz Spayd, Welcome to the State of Paranoia; Why America Wallows in Waco and Whitewater, WASH. POST, July 23, 1995, at
C1 (discussing American's distrust of government).
" See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1393114040 (1994), especially 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
5 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
6 See Education Amendments of 1972 §§ 901-909, 86 Stat. 235, 373-75 (1972),
(current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994)). Title IX states, in pertinent part: "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994); see
also Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65 (holding that Title IX could support a claim for monetary
damages under its implied right of action).
' David G. Savage, School Officials Face Lawsuits if They Ignore Sexual Harassment of Students, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, at A24.
8 See infra Part 1II; see also Matthew J.Conigliaro, Recent Development, Walton v.
Alexander: The Fifth Circuit Limits a State's Fourteenth Amendment Duty to Protect to
Instances of Involuntary Restraint, 70 TUL. L. REV. 393, 406-07 (1995) (stating that
"[w]hether the circuit courts are correct in their interpretation of the law in this area ...state officials can take comfort in the fact that this is one subject upon which the
circuits, at least for now, agree").
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mentary,9 a few district court decisions,' ° and some suggestive language by
several federal circuit courts."
The debate, bristling with thorny issues, continues unabated, both
through litigation 2 and media coverage. 3 The issues surrounding the debate over a school's duty to protect its students are thorny, and the different
situations in which these issues can surface are myriad. Because the question of a school's duty to its students sweeps broadly across many factual
circumstances and legal issues, three hypothetical scenarios might best illustrate the precise inquiry this Note addresses.
In Scenario One, Abby is an able-bodied student attending a local high
school. Abby, fourteen years old and therefore under the age of majority, 4
attends an after-school social event hosted by a school-sponsored organization. Students arrive at and leave the event, which is held inside the school
building, as they wish. While waiting outside-but still on school
grounds-with friends for a ride home, Abby is shot and killed by another
student. 5 Scenario One asks whether the school had a constitutional duty
to protect Abby from the violent act of the other student. 6 This scenario
falls outside the scope of this Note. 7
In Scenario Two, Bobby, also under the age of majority and thus compelled to attend his junior high school by virtue of the state truancy and

'o

See infra Part IV.
See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text.

"

See infra Parts III.B.1-2.

'

See, e.g., Stevens v. Umsted, 921 F. Supp. 530 (C.D. II1. 1996) (holding that the
superintendent of a residential school for visually impaired students owed no duty to
protect a developmentally and visually challenged child from sexual abuse perpetrated
by other students over a ten-year period), affid, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997). As footnote 20, the Introduction, and Part V below will make apparent, this Note focuses mainly on situations similar to the Stevens case, that is, a school's constitutional duty to
protect disabled students at residential schools.
13 See, e.g., David Heckelman, School Chief Not Liable for Attacks on Disabled
Student, 142 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 65 (1996); James G. Sotos, School Had Limited Duty
to Protect Student, 142 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 107 (1996).
14 Because Abby is under the age of majority, the state's truancy and compulsory
attendance laws apply. The significance, if any, of these statutes is discussed in Part II.
"5 This scenario is loosely, but not exactly, based on Leffall v. Dallas Independent
School District, 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994). The cases upon which Scenarios One
through Three are based have been varied in factual detail to better illustrate the breadth
of potential issues, most of which fall outside the scope of this Note, which is concerned specifically with the residential school setting for disabled students.
16 The Fifth Circuit said "no" in Leffall, 28 F.3d at 530, holding a school not liable
when one student shot another at a school-sponsored dance, but suggesting that a duty
would exist if a school official were to harm a student.
17 Many commentators have addressed the issue of whether to find a broad duty to
protect in such settings. Part IV attempts to summarize the positions taken by the commentators who have written about the field in general.
12
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mandatory attendance laws, is threatened repeatedly by a fellow student.
Bobby alerts school officials of the threats made against him. Even while
armed with such knowledge, the school officials take no action to protect
Bobby from the other student, who, the officials know, has a record of
sexually violent behavior. Ultimately, the other student sexually molests
Bobby on numerous occasions over the course of the year.18 Asked in a
different way, Scenario Two presents the question of whether school officials effectively deprived Bobby of his constitutional liberty interest as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.19 This scenario also falls outside the
scope of the present inquiry.
In Scenario Three, Chris, aged nine, is severely visually impaired and
functions intellectually on the level of a five-year-old. Chris attends a state
residential school for the visually impaired. Over a ten-year span, other
students at the school sexually molest Chris. The superintendent of the
school has notice of the sexual attacks, but does not provide Chris with an
environment reasonably safe from continued sexual abuse.2' The court
holds, however, that the handicaps notwithstanding, Chris had no constitutional right to be protected from repeated sexual abuse at the residential
school. This Note addresses Scenario Three.
Despite the differences among the above scenarios, in all three the constitutional and federal statutory backgrounds are the same. The cases constituting the bases for the scenarios all were brought under the federal statute
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a statutory right to a remedy for
Fourteenth Amendment due process violations.2
This Note consists of five parts. Part I discusses 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
its foundations. Part II addresses two main themes: (1) the DeShaney decision and its impact on the duty of state schools to protect their students, as
well as the pre-DeShaney foundations for finding such a duty; and (2) qualified immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, especially the way in which these immunities can effectively bar recovery, even if a

18 There

are multiple cases upon which this scenario is loosely, but not precisely,
based. Two of these cases are B.M.H. v. School Board, 833 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va.
1993), and Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1087 (1993),vacated, 15 F.3d 443 (1994) (en banc), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 815 (1994).
" See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that a teacher may
use such force as he or she reasonably believes is necessary for the proper control,
training, or education of a child). Ingraham acknowledged that freedom from bodily
restraint and punishment falls within the liberty interest in personal security that is
protected from state deprivation without due process of law. See id. at 672-75.
' Scenario Three, the general focus of this Note, is based loosely, but not exactly,
on the plaintiff's complaint, which was dismissed with prejudice, in Stevens v. Umsted,
921 F. Supp. 530 (C.D. I11.1996), affid, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997).
21 See infra Part I.
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duty to protect were found to exist. Part III discusses the case law in this
area, which, though it generally finds no duty to protect, evinces (1) divergences and misconceptions among courts, creating ambiguity and speculation that a duty to protect students may exist in some circumstances; and
(2) differences in opinion in at least two, and perhaps three, district court
cases. Part IV discusses the positions among the commentators, who for the
most part have dealt exclusively with the broad issue of whether there
should be found a constitutional duty to protect students at school. Part V
recommends that a constitutional duty to protect the disabled at state residential schools is the most factually tenable, and least judicially expansive,
solution to the sweeping no-duty-to-protect dilemma.
I. PROVIDING CIVIL REMEDIES FOR DEPRIVATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A.

The ConstitutionalDimension Requirement

Section 1983 was enacted to provide remedies at law and in equity
against deprivations of constitutional and federal statutory rights.22 When a
student suffers an unlawful harm at school, he is likely to have suffered the
deprivation of the right to be free from unlawful harm.23 This begs the
question: If a wrong has been committed against the student, why not let
him recover in tort? Put another way: When would a wrong rise to the level
of a constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983?
To be sure, § 1983 does not replace traditional tort law. The Court

22 See 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF § 1983, at 5 (3d ed. 1991). Section 1983, entitled "Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights," states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
2 This right extends to "unlawful harms." Corporal punishment administered to a
student at least instinctively may be perceived as creating some kind of harm, even if
the net result of the punishment yields a benefit to society. Corporal punishment, however, when reasonably administered for a child's proper control, training, or education,
thus far has been held to be constitutional. See, e.g., Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 161.
4 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986). But see Harold S. Lewis,
Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
755, 760 (1992) (arguing that in reshaping § 1983, contemporary tort law should "flesh
out not only ancillary procedural and remedial gaps but also the statute's most basic
standards of liability and defense"). The suggestions in Part V of the Lewis and
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has been vocal, if not completely clear, in its distinctions between tort law
and actions cognizable under § 1983: "Our Constitution deals with the large
concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability
for injuries that attend living together in society."' Furthermore, traditional
civil wrongs do not necessarily give rise to constitutional deprivations by
virtue of the location of the act or the relationship of the actors. 2 To this
end, even if a defendant were a state actor, the violation would not necessarily take on constitutional dimensions.27 Particularly in the school setting,
the mere fact that an element of supervision exists between school officials
and students, supervisory liability, or respondeat superior, "cannot be a basis
of [constitutional] liability."2
B. The Synergy Between the FourteenthAmendment and § 1983

In order to show an actionable constitutional violation, a claim must tap
into the synergy between § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.29 The
Fourteenth Amendment commands that states may not "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law."3 Two interrelated components may be said to constitute the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause: (1) a procedural component and (2) a substantive component. The Court in Daniels v. Williams31 described the interplay between
the procedural and the substantive components of the Due Process Clause:
By requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to "deprive any person of life,

Blumoff article "are designed principally to foster entity accountability and to further
the subsidiary goals of compensating victims and facilitating the dynamic declaration of
federal rights." Id. at 761.
z Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
26 "Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because
the victim is a prisoner." Id. at 333 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976)).
27 "[F]alse imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
merely because the defendant is a state official." Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 433
U.S. 137, 146 (1979)).
2sStoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Stoneking II) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691) (1978)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
29 Due process became applicable to the states when "[tihe Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment [was] later incorporated into the Fourteenth." Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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liberty, or property," the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions. And by barring certain government
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them, . . . [the Due Process Clause] serves to
prevent governmental power from being "used for purposes
of oppression."3 2
The synergistic effect of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 lies in
their roots.33 Section 1983 originally was based on section 1 of the Ku
Klux Clan Act of April 20, 1871.' The rationale behind § 1983 was to
deter and punish de facto state approval of private deprivations of constitutional rights.35
C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that an action
was taken under the color of state law 36 and (2) that he suffered "a deprivation of a right protected by the Constitution."37 A bifurcated, albeit contextually related, analysis emerges. First, the act constituting the deprivation
must be classifiable as a state action.3 8 To be so classified, the theory(ies)
behind the claim must qualify as state action under either (1) a negative, or
anti-interference analysis, or (2) an affirmative, or obligation-to-act, analysis;39 however, any act arguably qualifying as a state action still may es32

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement

Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856)).
"3See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 24, at 760. In fact, Professors Lewis and
Blumoff wrote that § 1983 "was passed to ensure" enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. Their article goes on to state that § 1983 "was originally passed as § 1
of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West Supp. 1997)), and titled 'An Act to enforce
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and for other Purposes."' Id. at 756 n.2.
34 See 17 Stat. 13 (1871); see also NAHMOD, supra note 22, at 5.
" See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 24 (providing, among other things, an excellent
and concise contextual and historical treatment of § 1983). This Note, which could
hardly begin to address the plethora of issues accompanying a complete analysis of
§ 1983, will limit its discussion of § 1983 to the role it plays under the present inquiry.
The failings of such an approach, it is hoped, will be excused.
36 See Brown v. City of Lake Geneva, 919 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)).
" Stevens v. Umstead, 921 F. Supp. 530, 532 (C.D. II!. 1996) (quoting Brown, 919
F.2d at 1301), aft'd, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997).
38 See infra Part I.D.1-2 (addressing this aspect of stating a § 1983 claim).
'9See infra Part I.D.1-2 (discussing the "negative, or anti-interference, prong" and
the "affirmative, or obligation-to-act, prong"). Although I have labeled these analyses in
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cape § 1983 liability if the standard of care attendant to the duty has not
been transgressed." Furthermore, in discussing the second element necessary to state a § 1983 claim-"a deprivation of a right protected by the
Constitution" 41-the
analytical focus must shift to the constitutional contours, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, of finding a constitutional right
leading to recovery. 2
D. Circumstances Recognizing § 1983 Claims: Constitutional Theories or

Blunderbuss Bases for Finding or Denying Relief?
When classified and compartmentalized, as is done below, the different,
though highly interrelated,43 theories upon which a plaintiff may assert a
claim for constitutional deprivation under § 1983 have conceptual appeal;
however, given the constricted confines within which courts find such con-

stitutional liability," and taking into account the numerous theories arguing
for liability, it might be argued that these bases, or predicates, for finding a

constitutional duty are really a shotgun approach for finding relief.45 Ac-

my own way, I have drawn upon generally established terminology.
40

See infra Part I.D.3 (discussing the quantum, or standard, of care applicable to

§ 1983 claims).
4 Stevens, 921 F. Supp. at 532 (quoting Brown, 919 F.2d at 1301).
42 Because this shift entails several ancillary inquiries, the whole of Part II is devoted to attempting this analysis. For example, in discussing when the deprivation of a
right will allow recovery, the question of applicable immunities to liability is subsumed
by, but nevertheless set out separately in, Part II.
4" After reading Part I.C, these theories, although often discussed by courts as
though they are discrete, may appear so interrelated that the lines of abstract demarcation at times become blurred to the point of disappearance. This assertion perhaps
merits an entire study unto itself and cannot, therefore, be dealt with adequately here;
however, a short example might well be warranted: Courts have deliberated over finding § 1983 liability when the state has "created a danger," as well as when a state has
taken a person into "custody" so as to restrain the person's ability to take care of himself. It might be argued with some force of logic that when the state takes a citizen into
custody-by sending the citizen to jail, for example-,and harm befalls her even partly
as a result of being in custody, the state effectively has helped create the danger. To delineate between these abstract classifications for convenience, it might be asserted that
the harm inflicted upon the citizen was attributable to an actor not officially related to
the state, such as a fellow prisoner, for example. In that case, it might be argued, the
state did not create the danger, thus extricating one theory's classification from direct
overlap with another. To varying degrees, however, the circularity of such logic-namely, as a need for a scheme of theoretical classifications-might not seem all
too easily escapable, despite any likely real-world concerns over causation.
4 See infra Part IV.
4 See, for example, Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 24 passim, who discuss § 1983's
lack of teeth, so to speak.

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:3

cording to extant judicial decisions, classifying these theories is necessary
for the analysis that follows.
1. The Negative, or Anti-Interference, Prong
The Constitution has been characterized as a "charter of negative liberties."46 Although the citizenry can expect to be protected from unconstitutional interference by the government, the government is absolved from
affirmative constitutional obligations.7 Under the "negative" rights construct, two main situations surface in which courts have been willing to
countenance a claim under § 1983.48 First, when the state "creates a danger," an unconstitutional interference, and thus an action under § 1983, may
lie.4 Second,5" a § 1983 action may arise under the negative-prong analysis when a state official, acting in an official capacity, interferes with the
(negative) right to be free from unconstitutional government intrusion. 1

46

Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
See id.

Although such unconstitutional state interference requires an act of some sort, and
thus might appear to be affirmative in nature, the focus of the analytic inquiry of when
a § 1983 claim is recognized falls primarily on the right in question-namely the broad,
superalternate right to be left alone, that is, to be free of interference. This right falls
under the concept of a "charter of negative liberties," not on the narrower, subalternate
fact-specific inquiry. This is not to say, however, that a particular act in question cannot
affect which right may be at stake and to what degree such a right will be protected.
That is, there is certainly a right to be free from unconstitutional intrusions on one's
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. If such an intrusion were found to have occurred, it is not overreaching to say that although an intrusion such as corporal punishment, when reasonably administered, would not likely constitute a viable § 1983 claim,
see, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), an unreasonable police search
might give rise to a valid claim, see, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4Q "The state-created danger theory, utilized to find a constitutional tort duty under
§ 1983 outside of a strictly custodial context, has been recognized by several court of
appeals." D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373
(3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (emphasis added) (citing Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake,

880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Wood v. Ostrander,
879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990); Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984)), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). The significance of the emphasized portion of the quote
will become apparent in Part II.A.2.
o A third situation may well exist for finding an actionable § 1983 claim under the
negative, or anti-interference, prong. In Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1376-77, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the theory of a "[c]onspiracy to [d]eprive [p]laintiffs
of [c]onstitutional [r]ights," but denied liability.
" See Stephen Faberman, The Lessons of DeShaney: Special Relationships, Schools
& the Fifth Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV. 97, 100 (1993) (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172
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2. The Affirmative, or Obligation-to-Act,Prong
The characterization of the Constitution as a "charter of negative libernotwithstanding, the government at times may have an affirmative
duty to secure constitutional rights. 3 For example, the government may
have an affirmative duty to protect against the conduct of its subordities ''s2

nates. 4 The government also may have an affirmative duty to act when it
has taken "a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will . . . ."" A third situation falls roughly between a government's duty to
protect against the conduct of its subordinates and when the government has
taken a person into its custody: "A state defendant may be held liable for

deliberately and recklessly establishing and maintaining a custom, practice
or policy which caused harm to a student when a teacher sexually molested

a student."56

(permitting suit under § 1983 when a police officer entered a home in the middle of the
night and forced the plaintiff to stand naked while an illegal search took place)).
52

Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618.

s See infra notes 54-56.
See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). In Canton, the Court held that
a municipality's failure to train police officers could be the basis of a § 1893 claim if it
constituted deliberate indifference to a detained person's constitutional rights. See id. at
388-90.
" DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989) (emphasis added) (discussing the Supreme Court's holdings in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)). The "custody"
classification also has been called "special relationship custody," mainly by plaintiffs
borrowing, perhaps, from the pre-DeShaney language of the in loco parentis construct.
See, e.g., Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1369-70; see infra Part II.B. The Third Circuit, for
example, played down the "special relationship" language, and instead stressed "custody": "Our court has read DeShaney primarily as setting out a test of physical custody."
Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370 (citing Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 167 (3d Cir. 1989)). Indeed, the DeShaney court distanced itself from the theme of "special relationships"
giving rise to "affirmative duties to act under the common law of tort" by stating:
"[T]he claim here is based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which, as we have said many times, does not transform every tort committed by a state
actor into a constitutional violation." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 (referring to Professors
Prosser's and Keeton's seminal work on the law of torts, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984)).
16 Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1376 (emphasis added) (citing Stoneking v. Bradford
Area Sch. Dist. , 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)(1990)) (Stoneking 1I), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1044 (1990)). The Third Circuit did not find that Stoneking 11's "linchpin"
triggered liability in Middle Bucks because, it stated flatly, "[§] 1983 liability [in Middle
Bucks] may not be predicated upon a Stoneking I type theory because private actors
committed the underlying acts." Id.
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3. The Quantum, or Standard,of Care

If § 1983 does not "purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying
down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living
together in society, 57 and if the "Constitution deals with the large con-

cerns,"58 it may be asked what degree of care must be breached for a plaintiff successfully to raise a § 1983 claim. The Supreme Court repeatedly has
announced a standard of care it calls "deliberate indifference." 59 Deliberate
indifference seems to fall short of intentional conduct, and more than "merely negligent"6 conduct probably is needed for liability to attach under
§ 1983.6" The deliberate indifference standard also applies to municipali-

ties.62

5 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
58

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.

' See Estelle 429 U.S. at 104 ("We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain."') (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)). The Court in Estelle

went on to say: "Regardless how evidenced, deliberate indifference ...

states a cause

of action under § 1983." Id. at 105. The rationale underlying this standard was explained by the following:
Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because
the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend "evolving standards of decency" .....

Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333.
61 For example, the Court has announced: "But in any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying right; and depending on the right,
merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim." Id. at 333 (emphasis
added). The language used by the Court in Daniels on the one hand seems to require
more than "merely negligent" conduct. On the other hand, as the seemingly permissive
language in the excerpt from Daniels reveals, the Court seems to have suggested that
the deliberate indifference standard might not be a standard of care cast in stone.
62 "'[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives' by city
policymakers." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)). (Returning parenthetically to the discussion
on whether the theories upon which constitutional liability claims are brought conceptually merit classification, or whether they constitute blunderbuss approaches to finding
such liability. The instant language in Canton v. Harriscould appear to foreclose liability under the "creation of danger" theory because often no choice is made, or available,
in such cases).
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Even if numerous, previously recognized theories of state action or
inaction63 are advanced and an arguable case of deliberate indifference is
shown, the "underlying right"' still must be established.65 This underlying
right will be shaped66 to a great extent by which state action or inaction
allegedly led to the situation evincing deliberate indifference. Despite the

varied factual circumstances in which § 1983 liability has been alleged in
the lower courts, so far such an underlying constitutional right has been
established only in a handful of Supreme Court decisions. It is to these

cases that the present investigation now turns.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTOURS OF FINDING § 1983 LIABILITY:
TRADITIONAL PRE-DESHANEY THEORIES OF LIABILITY, DESHANEY, AND
IMMUNITIES
Two traditional and sometimes interrelated67 theories"

63

of § 1983 lia-

See supra Part I.D.1-2.
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330.

65 The Supreme Court has said: "The 'deliberate indifference' standard we adopt for

§ 1983 'failure to train' claims does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a
plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation."
Harris,489 U.S. at 388 n.8; see also Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d
720, 724 (3d Cir. 1989) (Stoneking 11) (holding that a former student could maintain a
civil rights action against school officials for enforcing policies that caused harm to
student in form of the continued assault), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). The language in Harris does not diminish the precedential value of the deliberate indifference
standard; rather, it supports the organizational approach set forth in this Note, which
breaks down the elements of a § 1983 claim by broadly distinguishing among (1) the
alleged state action or inaction, see supra Parts I.C, I.D.1-2; (2) the standard of care,
see supra Part I.D.3; and (3) the underlying constitutional right, see infra Part II. This
organizational approach does not conflict with what the Supreme Court said in Estelle
v. Gamble: "Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious
illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983." 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Upon
close reading, the language used by the Court subsumes, albeit under Estelle's narrow
factual confines, each element necessary for stating a claim under § 1983, thereby affirming the conceptual scheme used in Parts I and II because no court likely would
allow § 1983 liability to attach solely upon a showing of deliberately indifferent conduct, absent a cognizable theory of state action or inaction as well as an underlying
constitutional right.
66 Because the particular theory asserting a state's action or inaction will shape the
underlying constitutional right, these two elements of a § 1983 suit may be said to exist
in a legally axiomatic symbiosis.
67 Once again, conceptual demarcations could be collapsed to create one theory,
where before there were two. Namely, one could argue that custody subsumes in loco
parentis,or that in loco parentis occupies but one area within the broader custody analysis. Because the post-DeShaney decisions perpetuate the distinction, so will this Note.
68 Here, the term traditional refers to theories advanced before the Court's decision
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bility have resulted in judicial recognition of an underlying constitutional
right: "custody" and "in loco parentis" status."9 "Custody" continues to
provide a valid and recognized theory for articulating a state's duty for a
§ 1983 claim.70 A similar constitutional claim brought under a. theory of
"in loco parentis" would likely fail after the Court's 1989 landmark decision
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.7' More-

over, even when a judicially recognized theory of § 1983 is advanced and
accepted, and conduct rising to the level of deliberate indifference is proved,
potent immunities for state entities and officials usually prevent the recovery
72
of damages in a § 1983 suit.

A.

Custody

1. The PrisonerScenario

One theory of custody has created an underlying constitutional right

in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(holding that a state, through its protective services, has no duty to protect a child from
private violence). Other theories, such as those identified in Parts I.D.1 and I.D.2, have
arisen since that decision.
69 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (custody analysis); Stoneking v.
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594, 600-03 (3d Cir. 1988) (Stoneking 1)(in loco
parentis analysis), vacated sub nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989). "In
loco parentis," translated from the Latin, simply means "in place of the parent," and the
term's meaning has been described thus: "Anyone who serves in loco parentis may be
considered to have responsibilities of guardianship, either formal or informal, over
minors." EUGENE EHRLICH, AMO, AMAS, AMAT AND MORE: How TO USE LATIN TO
YOUR OWN ADVANTAGE AND TO THE ASTONISHMENT OF OTHERS 154 (1985).
70 See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 137071 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). At least one other
theory of a state's action or inaction, apart from "custody" or "in loco parentis"/"special relationship," yielded judicial recognition of an underlying constitutional
right. The Third Circuit's decision in Stoneking I allowed a student to maintain a
§ 1983 action against school officials for their alleged deliberate indifference to the
consequences, policies, practices, and customs of failing to take action with respect to
complaints of the sexual misconduct of a teacher who allegedly caused the student to
suffer a constitutional harm. See Stoneking 11, 882 F.2d at 722-23; see also supra Part
I.D.2. The Third Circuit issued this ruling even on the heels of the Supreme Court's
decision in DeShaney. Custody is discussed in Part II.A. Part II.C discusses five analytical factors flowing from DeShaney.
S" 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Compare Stoneking 1, 856 F.2d at 600-03, with Middle
Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370-71. The demise of "in loco parentis" as a recognized theory
leading to § 1983 recovery is discussed in Part ll.B.
72 See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 24, at 756-57. Immunities are addressed in Part

1998]

AND WHAT OF THE MEEK?

sufficient for finding § 1983 liability under a prisoner scenario: "[W]hen
someone is incarcerated, the Eighth Amendment (via the Fourteenth) re' A restraintquires the State to provide him with adequate medical care."73
on-liberty rationale undergirds the theory of custody that recognized an
underlying constitutional right. The progenitor of the restraint-on-liberty
rationale can be found in the Court's reasoning in Estelle v. Gamble:74
[E]lementary principles establish the government's obligation
to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authorities to
treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those
needs will not be met. . . . "[I]t is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of
the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself."'75
In 1989, the DeShaney decision became the successor of the "narrow range
of cases"76 recognizing an underlying right under a theory of custody.77

Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). A reminder is in order here. By its holding, the Court in
Estelle did not formulate a theory of strict liability for prisons: "Medical malpractice
does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In
order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference ... that can offend 'evolving standards of
decency' . . . ." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added). Even when adequate custo-

dy obtains in fact, that is, the underlying constitutional right is recognized, the plaintiffprisoner still must base his claim on a theory allowing the right to be found and must
show deliberate indifference on the part of the state.
429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that the Constitution imposes an affirmative duty on
the state to provide prisoners with adequate medical care).
I at 103-04 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)).
Id.
76

Gregory, 67 F.3d at 1297.

See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
The DeShaney decision, confirming its successorship to the restraint-on-liberty rationale,
stated:
In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the

"deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not
its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other
means.
Id. at 200 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The emphasized language in the above
quote has led one judge to argue quite discerningly that DeShaney in effect staked out a
broader position than the Court did in Estelle. See, e.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1379 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Sloviter,
C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:3

2. The (Involuntary?)Mental Patient Scenario
The custody theory coupled with the restraint-on-liberty rationale has
been employed in one other setting that recognized a plaintiff's underlying
constitutional right. When the state committed a person to a state mental
institution against her will, the Court found that the Constitution imposed
affirmative duties upon the state to provide the patient with services necessary to ensure the safety of the patient and others.7" In its reasoning in
Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court injected a new, or at least a newly articulated, variable in the restraint-on-liberty rationale: namely, whether the establishment of an underlying right must turn on the voluntariness of the particular restraint on liberty.79 Nowhere in Youngberg did the Court enunciate
explicitly that the voluntariness variable constitutes a requisite component of
the restraint-on-liberty rationale. In fact, in discussing the general nature of
the "historic liberty interest," the Court quoted its decision in Ingraham v.
Wright,8" a case that addressed corporal punishment in a public day school,
a setting that so far has not been likened successfully to prisons or state
mental institutions.8 ' In comparing the involuntarily committed mental patient with a prisoner, however, the Court said: "[I]f it is cruel and unusual
punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be
unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who may not be
punished at all-in unsafe conditions." 2

199 (citing Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) ("[T]he
Due Process Clause . . . require[s] the responsible government or governmental agency
to provide medical care to persons . . . who have been injured while being apprehended
by the police").
78 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court enunciated the affirmative duties the state owed to the patient:
[T]he State is under a duty to provide [the patient] with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate
his ability to function free from bodily restraints ... or the likelihood of violence.
[The patient] thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and
such training as may be required by these interests.
Id. at 324.
79

See id. at 314-19.

430 U.S. 651 (1977).
See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673).
82 Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added). This language does not have to be read as binding a requirement of "involuntariness" to the restraint-on-liberty rationale. It can be
argued that the Court in Youngberg, as per the facts of that case, in effect was issuing a
warning to mental institutions that the committed, even if involuntarily committed, may
not be further restrained such that those restraints would constitute punishment. See discussion infra Part V.
80
81
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"In Loco Parentis"

As an alternative to "custody," in loco parentis is the other traditional
theory that led to judicial recognition of an underlying constitutional right in
a § 1983 suit. 3 Often invoked in the school setting, in loco parentis status
has been used to show sufficient custody over a student for the purpose of
establishing a constitutional right to require the state to act or refrain from
acting.' After DeShaney, however, in loco parentis, even when coupled

83

See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594, 600-03 (3d Cir.

1988) (Stoneking 1), vacated sub nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989).
Stoneking I is a pre-DeShaney decision that perhaps best serves as a paradigm for illustrating both the in loco parentis theory and its shared conceptual roots with the custody
theory. In fact, Stoneking I announced the proposition that in loco parentis status might
rise to the level of "functional custody," thus eroding the distinction between custody,
found in the prisoner and (involuntary) mental patient scenarios, and in loco parentis,
usually applicable in educational settings. Id. at 601. The Supreme Court apparently
rejected the erosion between a pure "custody" analysis and one based on in loco parentis, which in the wake of DeShaney no longer sufficed as a theory to establish an underlying right in § 1983 suits. The Supreme Court thus remanded Stoneking I to the Third
Circuit for reevaluation consistent with its then recently announced decision in
DeShaney. See id at 604. Far from reversing its finding that a student had an underlying right not to be sexually abused by a teacher, the Third Circuit did not interpret
DeShaney on its ambiguities, but instead chose to base its decision on a broad reading
of DeShaney. It reclassified the theory of liability and held that DeShaney did not bar a
finding that school officials faced liability as a result of setting up policies, practices,
and customs that displayed deliberate indifference to the safety of students. See
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989) (Stoneking I1), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); see also supra Parts I.D.1-2.
For example, the Third Circuit's pre-DeShaney ruling in Stoneking I said: "Moreover, Pennsylvania law has since 1911 explicitly vested school officials with authority
in loco parentis over students." 856 F.2d at 601. The court cited the relevant Pennsylvania statute, which stated:
Every teacher, vice principal and principal in the public schools shall have the
right to exercise the same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils
attending his school, during the time they are in attendance, including the time
required in going to and from their homes, as the parents, guardians or persons in
parental relation to such pupils may exercise over them.
Id. at 601 n.10 (quoting 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1317 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (amended
1992)). Finally, the Third Circuit decided: "There is thus an adequate basis from the
Pennsylvania child abuse reporting and in loco parentis statutes, coupled with the broad
common law duty owed by school officials to students, to conclude there was a desire
on the part of the state to provide affirmative protection to students." Id. at 603.
Other pre-DeShaney cases from other circuits likewise rested their decisions on in
loco parentis theories of creating an underlying constitutional right to expect or be free
from state action. See generally Barbara L. Horwitz, Case Note, The Duty of Schools to
Protect Students from Sexual Harassment: How Much Will the Law Allow? Doe v.
Taylor Independent School District, 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.
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with school truancy and mandatory attendance laws, no longer suffices as a
theory to establish an underlying constitutional right under § 1983.85 The
DeShaney decision, however, did more than clearly discard in loco parentis

as an effective theory upon which to base a § 1983 suit.
C. The DeShaney Decision: Constitutional Clarity or Just More Confusion
by Judicial Constriction?

At the age of five, after a history of abuse, Joshua DeShaney was so
severely beaten by his father, Randy DeShaney, that Joshua was left permanently "profoundly retarded." 6 The county's department of social services previously had received complaints of Randy DeShaney's ongoing
abuse of Joshua." Social workers took steps to protect Joshua, including
obtaining a court order to place Joshua under the temporary custody of the
hospital that had treated him for injuries suspected to have been inflicted by

Caplinger v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993), reh'g granted en banc, 987 F.2d 231 (5th
Cir. 1993), 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1211 n.239 (1994) (citing the following preDeShaney cases: Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1987)
(finding that a school bus driver "was entrusted with care of students attending school
under Texas' compulsory education statute"); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.,
690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that a school had a duty to protect students
from harm posed by antisocial activities), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 1207 (1983); Doe v.
Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1243-44 (Idaho 1986) (holding that a school district could be
liable for its negligence arising out of a teacher's sexual assault of students);
Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash. 1988) (holding that a public school could not condition a student's participation in athletics on the student's
releasing the school district from all potential negligence claims because school districts
had a duty to protect students in its custody).
"5 Thus the Third Circuit, the same circuit that had gone so far as to recognize a
"functional custody" analysis in Stoneking I, now said: "[S]ection 13-1317
[Pennsylvania's in loco parentis statute] 'invests authority in public school teachers; it
does not impose a duty upon them."' D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (quoting a 1982
Pennsylvania Commonwealth court decision based not on in loco parentis, but on a
child protective service law), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). Chief Judge Sloviter,
who authored the "functional custody" language of Stoneking I, dissented from the
majority opinion, writing: "In their capacity as 'parents,' school officials can exercise
control over the movements of their students." Id. at 1380 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting);
see also Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (stating that in loco parentis does not create a duty that rises to a constitutional level), affd,
7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993). Several lower court decisions in the Second Circuit may
constitute an exception to the apparently universal demise of the utility of an in loco
parentis argument in § 1983 suits. Part III addresses the case law and, by inclusion, the
applicable exceptions.
86 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193 (1989).
87 See id. at 189.
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his father."8 The complaint alleged that in the face of frequent reports of
abuse and her own firsthand suspicions of the abuse, the social worker "did
nothing more" than record these incidents in her files.8 9
In a § 1983 suit brought by Joshua and his mother against Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, Joshua alleged that the county social
services department deprived him of "his liberty without due process of law,
in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, by failing to
intervene to protect him against a risk of violence at his father's hands of
which they knew or should have known."' The Court rejected Joshua's
claims, basing its decision on three grounds:
(1) "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence generally does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause, because the
Clause imposes no duty on the State to91provide members of the general
public with adequate protective services";
(2) "the State's knowledge of [Joshua's] danger and expressions of willingness to protect him against the danger" did not establish a "'special92
relationship' giving rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect";
and
(3) absent the State's creation of danger, "the Due Process Clause does not
transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional viola93
tion.
In its decision, the Court unveiled five factors relevant to the present
analysis. First, the Court held that some state action-namely, taking an
individual into custody-is necessary to find a special'relationship under
which a state's duty to protect the individual arises. 94 The Court further
buttressed its internal line of reasoning by referring to the restraint-on-liber-

s See id. at 192.
89 Id. at 193.
'x Id.
9'1Id.

at 189.
Id.
93 Id. at 190.
' See id. at 197-99. The language of the decision shows that DeShaney eschewed
the "special relationship" argument and instead focused its discussion on a "custody"
analysis:
Taken together, [the Estelle and Youngberg cases relied upon by the petitioners in
DeShaney] stand only for the proposition that when the State takes a person into
its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it
a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general
well-being.
Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added). The Court's analysis associates custody with the theory of the state's action or inaction, rather than with the pure underlying right that custody, as a theory, axiomatically shapes. See, e.g., supra note 65. This specific distinction
by association corroborates the organizational scheme in Parts I.D.1 through I.D.3, and
in Part II herein.
92
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ty rationale earlier found to apply in Estelle95 and Youngberg:96 "We reasoned that because the prisoner is unable 'by reason of the deprivation of
his liberty to care for himself,' it is only 'just' that the State be required to
care for him."97
Second, if the state takes no part in creating the danger, the state generally has no duty to protect.98 Because the government has no affirmative
duty to protect individual persons from one another, neither must the government be the guarantor of an individual's future protection, even if it
previously had acted to protect the individual.99 Here, however, the Court's
reasoning becomes less internally consistent. While the Court on the one
hand distinguishes § 1983 claims arising under constitutional due process
grounds from common law tort duties, it nevertheless invokes the language
of the tort rescuer-rescued rule."° That rule disallows the termination of a
rescue attempt if, once undertaken, termination would leave the victim
worse off than before the rescue began.' Under DeShaney, the government may initiate, then terminate, protection of an individual, as long as the
termination does not make the person any worse off:0 2
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that
Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their

creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more
vulnerable to them. That the State took temporary custody of
Joshua does not alter the analysis, for when it returned him
to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse position
than that in which he would have been had it not acted at

95

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

96

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).

' DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and
quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)). What the Court calls the
"deprivation of liberty" rationale is referred to by this Note as the "restraint-on-liberty
rationale." This is done to avoid confusion with discussions that employ the language
"deprivations of constitutional rights." The potential for confusion arises from the repeated use of the word "deprivation."
9 See id. at 200-03. One is reminded once more of a very real overlap between the
two theories of a state's action or inaction-"custody" and "creation of danger." That
the Court chose to retain the conceptual distinction remains noteworthy. See supra Parts
I.D.1-3.
See id. at 199-202.
1 See id. at 202.
lot See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) (stating that one
who undertakes to render services to another may in some circumstances be held liable
for doing so in a negligent fashion)).
102 See id. at 199-202.
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all; the State does not become the permanent guarantor of an
individual's safety by having once offered him shelter." 3
Third, DeShaney revealed a patent ambiguity in its strict construction of
constitutional duties. In a well-known footnote, the Court created what
might be called the traditional ambiguity that courts and commentators have
seized upon to liken the school setting to "foster care," of which the Court
said: "Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua
from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents,
we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarcerationor institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect."' 14 In attempting°6
5 and commentators'
to apply the "custody" analogy to schools, courts

103

Id. at 201. The argument, however, is not that the state owes a permanent, or

unending, duty to protect the individual. Rather, the argument is that for the time during
which the state does act-when a disabled child resides at a state residential
school-then during that time, the state owes a constitutionally recognized duty to protect. See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After
DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940 (1990). It seems that, at least among the commentators, Huefner was the first to write of this critical distinction.
104 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9 (emphasis added). One commentator, for instance,
directly corroborates that this is "an oft-cited footnote, that an affirmative duty to protect might arise where the state, by the affirmative exercise of its power, removes a
child from free society and places him in a foster home operated by its agents."
Faberman, supra note 51, at 110 n.91. Technically, it may be noted that the Court's
footnote creates at least one patent, and perhaps two latent, ambiguities. First, the Court
did not disclose whether it recognized the foster home situation as fully analogous to
incarceration or institutionalization (patent ambiguity). Second, the Court did not make
clear whether it contemplated other "analogous" situations, apart from the foster care
situation, in order to recognize a duty to protect (possible latent ambiguity). The Court
did state, however, that "the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty---" may trigger the Due Process Clause. DeShaney, 489
U.S. at 200. Thus, this first latent ambiguity may a priori never have arisen. The Court,
however, has not addressed whether involuntariness is a sine qua non in recognizing a
duty by analogy (latent ambiguity). This latent ambiguity escaped the Court's clarification and, like its patent counterpart, has found its way into the circuit court decisions.
See infra Part V.B.1.
105 For an overview of the major cases and their reasoning in this area, see infra Part
III. As the case law in Part ilireveals, this approach by analogy at best has produced
only dicta, at least on the federal circuit court level, with two New York district courts
having held to the contrary as per the apparently prevailing attitude in the Second Circuit. See Robert G. v. Newburgh City Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 3210 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
1990) (denying a motion to dismiss a female student's claim against school officials
based on a sexual assault perpetrated by a substitute teacher); Pagano v. Massapequa
Public Schs., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying a motion to dismiss a
student's claim against school officials based on a series of physical and verbal assaults
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have focused on the elements of school attendance-namely, truancy and
compulsory attendance laws, and in loco parentis status-and the circumstances particular to the student-age, ability to articulate complaints, and

type of school.
Fourth, footnote nine in the DeShaney decision is remarkable not only
for creating the patent ambiguity of analogizing foster homes to custody in
the prisoner or mental patient settings to find a constitutional duty, but also

for creating a latent ambiguity: "[W]e might have a situation sufficiently
analogous to incarceration or institutionalizationto give rise to an affirma-

tive duty to protect."''

Quietly absent from the Court's reference to "insti-

tutionalization" as a basis for custody is any mention of the voluntariness of

that institutionalization."~ This latent ambiguity arises in the face of the
by other students).
106

For an overview of the trends and analyses among commentators writing on the

broad subject of a duty to protect in the general school setting, see infra Part IV.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9 (emphasis added).
o See supra Part II.A.2. The American edition of The Ojcford Dictionary and Thesaurus defines "institutionalize" as follows:
v.tr.1 (as INSTITUTIONALIZED adj.) (of a prisoner, a long-term patient, etc.) made
apathetic and dependent after a long period in an institution. 2 place or keep (a
person) in an institution ... 2 see put away 3 (PUT').
PUT AWAY ... (3 A jail, incarcerate, send up, Brit. send down, sl. jug; confine;

see also IMPRISON) 1. B commit, institutionalize ....
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 776, 1219 (American ed. 1996) (emphases

added). This rather straightforward reading of "institutionalize" would, under the definitions above, be susceptible to being interpreted as meaning both penal incarceration and
mental institutionalization; however, because the Court in DeShaney specifically used
both phrases-incarceration and institutionalization-in discussing two different cases
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982),
the noun "institutionalization" might well be read to exclude any relation to imprisonment. Although the verb "institutionalize" is transitive, from which a passive can be
formed, and might thus be read to imply that the Court was referring only to the involuntary commitment of a patient by the state, that is, a commitment or institutionalization rendering a patient's will passive and thus the institutionalization involuntary, this
analysis is neither complete nor satisfactory. Although the state may institutionalize a
person, so may, and often do, the family, the doctor, or the friends of a patient. To say
that the patient was institutionalized does not say who, according to the Court, must
have done the institutionalizing in order for sufficient custody to arise. As a possible
guidepost, one might recall that the restraint-on-liberty rationale undergirds the validity
and vitality of the custody theory, which in the first instance gives rise to the Court's
discussion of incarceration and institutionalization. If that is so, then it might be argued
that the restraint on one's liberty, which is both the crux of the custody theory and its
nexus for establishing an underlying constitutional right, does not depend solely upon
compulsion, that is, voluntariness or involuntariness. This perhaps is necessarily so
because different settings produce different degrees of restraint as well as the attendant
compulsion, if indeed there is any. By way of example, a comatose patient may have
his liberty restrained through institutionalization although no compulsion accompanied
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Court's repeated references to Youngberg v. Romeo," which held that the
state had a constitutional duty to protect an involuntarily institutionalized
mental patient. So far, the courts remain split on whether voluntarily and
involuntarily committed patients, or voluntarily and involuntarily attending
students, should be entitled to the same constitutional rights."'
Fifth, because of DeShaney's strict constitutional construction of the Due
Process Clause, and the resulting curtailment of actionable deprivations of
rights in § 1983 suits, state tort actions often are left as the only means to
redress constitutional wrongs."' Apart from ignoring the potential constitu-

the act of placing the patient in the institution. Additionally, the identity of the institutionalizing party would not affect the compulsion analysis, for, under this example, no
identity exists. This illustration might be uncommon in daily life, but other examples
may be devised to demonstrate that different degrees of restraint on one's liberty may
be accompanied by different degrees of compulsion-again, if any happens to exist. But
cf Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1990) (involving a suicidal
detainee kept in county jail on criminal charges brought by his family to keep him
under temporary protective custody), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906 (1991).
1- 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
"o See, e.g., Stevens v. Umsted, 921 F. Supp. 530, 534 (C.D. III. 1996) (acknowledging, before dismissing with prejudice Stevens's complaint for want of a constitutional
duty to protect a handicapped child at a residential school, that "the courts disagree ... whether states are liable for injuries caused to voluntary state mental patients"), affid, 131 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 1997). The cases that District Judge Richard Mills
cited in Stevens v. Umsted are the following: Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr.,
Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that the Commonwealth's possibly
negligent actions "did not take on the added character of violations of the federal Constitution"); Buffington, 913 F.2d at 119 ("Nothing in the [DeShaney] Court's rationale
for finding that some affirmative duty arises once the state takes custody of an individual can be read to imply that the existence of the duty somehow turns on the reason for
taking custody."); Fialowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459 (3d
Cir. 1990) (finding no due process right to protection because a resident at a state
"home had been placed there by his parents' insistence and apparently was free to
leave"); Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("[Wlhile the court
need not consider the constitutional significance of voluntary admission on this motion,
there is much logic in cases that find voluntary and involuntary residents entitled to the
same constitutional rights to a safe environment.").Id. at 535 n.5 (emphasis added).
Cases discussing aspects of voluntariness in the school setting are discussed in Part III.
.. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202. To this end, the Court said: "[T]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment... does not transform every tort committed by a
state actor into a constitutional violation." Id. The Court went even further in distinguishing constitutional violations from state tort remedies:
The people of Wisconsin may well prefer a system of liability which would place
upon the State and its officials the responsibility for failure to act in situations
such as the present one. They may create such a system, if they do not have it
already, by changing the tort law of the State in accordance with the regular lawmaking process. But they should not have it thrust upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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tional dimensions of certain claims, however, judicially compelled or de
facto reliance upon state tort remedies forces plaintiffs to confront damage
caps protecting states from unlimited liability." 2 A number of policy arguments suggest that a narrow reading of § 1983 remedies should be rejected;" 3 but even if the elemental hurdles blocking a plaintiff's suit against a
state actor under § 1983 were not enough, one further stumbling block exists: immunity."'

D. QualifiedImmunity and Eleventh Amendment Immunity
1. Qualified Immunity
A state actor may be named as a defendant in a § 1983 suit in his individual or official capacity." 5 A state actor who is so named in his individual capacity will likely escape liability under the doctrine of qualified
immunity." 6 The question that surfaces next is: When does qualified im-

munity insulate a state actor in his individual capacity? The case of Harlow
v. Fitzgerald"7 supplied the modem judicial answer: "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutionalrights of which a reasonableperson would
have known.""' Thus, "[i]f, as a matter of law, the official could not have
known about the existence of the right allegedly infringed, he [the official]
escape[s] accountability."" 9 In formulating its objective standard test for

Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
112 For

example, John Hefner, Jr., the plaintiff's attorney in Stevens v. Umsted, noted,

"[l]f he had not raised the constitutional issue, he would have had to file suit in the
Illinois Court of Claims, where a $100,000 limit on recovery applies." Heckelman,
supra note 13, at 65; see also Stevens, 921 F. Supp. 530.
113 In addition to Lewis and Blumoff's article, supra note 24, Part V of this Note
develops arguments as they possibly pertain to the setting of residential schools for the
disabled.
"t See infra Part lI.D.
"By its terms, § 1983 liability attaches to '[e]very person' who causes the loss of
rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Thus an individual
state actor is unexceptionally within the statute's reach." Lewis & Blumoff, supra note
24, at 769.
11 See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (establishing that state
government officials with discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity
unless their actions violate clearly established law).
117

Id.

118 Id.
119

at 818 (emphasis added).
Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 24, at 779 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800 (1982)). This "objective standard" was further described by the Court:
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qualified immunity, "the Court simply" relied "entirely on an inquiry into
knowledge of and respect for "basic,
the official defendant's 'presumptive
' ' ' 2°
rights."
constitutional
unquestioned
2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

If a state official is sued in her official capacity for damages under
§ 1983, the Eleventh Amendment may bar all claims.' 2 1 Some evidence
exists that even if the underlying constitutional right in a § 1983 suit were
recognized, and all other elements of the claim proved, an official capacity
suit still would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 2 Professors Lewis

If the law at [the time an action occurred] was not clearly established, an official
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously
identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should
know the law governing his conduct.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. Lewis and Blumoff persuasively criticize this objective
standard for determining qualified immunity: .
In the end, the test for individual immunity in § 1983 actibns rests on an unnecessary fiction.... It is fictional because the purportedly "objective" standard for
determining qualified immunity rests on the fragile belief that the relatively lowlevel employee most likely to have actual citizen contact, the cop on the beat, for
example, appreciates the current state of constitutional law.
Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 24, at 783 (citations omitted).
12

Id. at 779.

"Qualified immunity does not apply to official capacity suits. But the Eleventh
Amendment does, and in this case, the Eleventh Amendment would presumably bar
Plaintiffs' claim for damages." Stevens v. Umsted, 921 F. Supp. 530, 536 (C.D. Ill.
1996), aff'd, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Apparently, although the text of the Amendment does not address suits by citizens of a
state brought against that same state, Eleventh Amendment immunity nevertheless attaches. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (extending the protections of the Eleventh Amendment to suits brought by a citizen against his own state).
" "Clearly a suit against the state for monetary damages or other retroactive relief is
barred by the eleventh amendment, regardlessof the predicatefor liability." Kolpak v.
Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 371 (N.D. I11.1985) (emphasis added) (citing Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 456 U.S. 89, 103 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 666-67 (1974)). One commentator insightfully clarified the interrelation between
suits against school boards or districts and the Eleventh Amendment:
Most school boards or school districts ... are considered local governmental
bodies, not arms of the state and thus can be sued in federal court. See Mt.
121
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and Blumoff made the following observation about § 1983's potency: "In
the past thirty years, the jurisprudence of this statute [§ 1983] in its historic
sphere-the redress of constitutional violations-has been molded by an
almost self-canceling dialectic: bursts of expansion in scope, followed by
equally striking doctrinal contractions.' '23 A brief glimpse into selected
federal court decisions may allow the present inquiry to truly discern whether § 1983, as applied to the school setting, currently is enjoying a judicial
burst of expansion or a doctrinal contraction in the wake of DeShaney, a
decision that created perhaps as much ambiguity as it did clarity.
III. CONSTERNATION IN THE CASE LAW DESPITE THE NEAR No-DUTY
CONSENSUS 24

The law of the circuit courts nearly uniformly reveals that schools generally have no duty to protect their students."2 Variations among the decisions do exist, however, especially in cases involving handicapped students
at residential schools." The confusion in the cases-amid the jumble of

Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In some states, however, a suit directly against a school will be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. For
example, the Ninth Circuit in Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d
248 (9th Cir. 1992), stated that "California has selected a different path from that
of most states. California has vested control of school funding in the state rather
than local governments." Id. at 254. A determinative factor in the decision was
the fact that school boards in California, unlike most school boards, do not derive
their funding mainly through local property taxes.
Michael Gilbert, Comment, Keeping the Door Open: A Middle Ground on the Question
of Affirmative Duty in the Public Schools, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 471, 472 n.3 (1993).
'z Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 24, at 769.
12 This Note does not aim to treat the subtleties in the cases constituting the broad
no-duty rule formulation, for example, the importance, if any, of whether the
transgressor or actor is a fellow student, a teacher, or other individual. Such an
undertaking would render this Note too unwieldy. Part III focuses on the judicial unease
palpable in some of the more important cases among the circuits, which, in at least
three district court decisions, has produced an opportunity to establish a bright-line
exception to the general no-duty rule in the case of residential schools for the disabled.
'2 See Conigliaro, supra note 8, at 406-07.
126 See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding
that a school had no duty to protect a voluntary residential student from sexual assault
by a classmate); Spivey v. Elliot, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that a special
relation existed between a student at a residential school and the state and that the special relation imposed a duty on the state to protect the student from sexual assault by a
classmate, but also finding that the duty was not clearly established at the time of the
attack and the officials were protected by qualified immunity), affd, 41 F.3d 1497
(1995); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 144 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that
whether a school superintendent and principal had qualified immunity against suit
brought by a high school student molested by a teacher depended on whether the super-
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§ 1983 theories for recovery, its standard of care, and the necessity for
establishing an underlying constitutional right-may well be due to an
unease born of judicial conscience and, arguably, constitutional axiom.
A. The Broad No-Duty Rule

When the Third Circuit refused in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School
District27 to dismiss a § 1983 suit brought by a student against her
teacher for sexual abuse, it stated that (1) the plaintiff had a constitutionally
protected right to be free from sexual abuse by her school teacher once the
defendants had notice of the teacher's alleged abuse of another student and
that (2) because "students are placed in school at the command of the state
and are not free to decline to attend, students are in what may be viewed as
the functional custody of the school authorities, at least at the time they are
Because DeShaney was decided shortly after the Third
present.''
Circuit's refusal to dismiss, Stoneking I was remanded to the Third Circuit
for reconsideration in line with the Supreme Court's holding in
DeShaney'2 9 In Stoneking Hi,3' the Third Circuit avoided the question of
custody and instead refused to dismiss the complaint on grounds that school
policies and customs maintained in deliberate indifference to Stoneking's
constitutional rights were actionable under § 1983.3
The Third Circuit soon reversed its position in D.R. v. Middlebucks Area
Vocational Techincal School,132 holding that a deaf student repeatedly
raped by fellow students was not in the custody of the school.'33 The existence of custody over the student could not be recognized, the court said,
because the parents remained the primary caretakers of the student and, for
its part, the school had not created or limited D.R.'s access to outside sup-

intendent and principal acted with deliberate indifference to the student's constitutional
rights), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1087 (1993), vacated, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994).
127 Stoneking

v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988)

(Stoneking 1), vacated sob. nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989).
12 Id. at 601 (emphasis added); see also supra note 83.
129

130

Stoneking 1, 489 U.S. at 604.
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989) (Stoneking

II), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). The Third Circuit's decision relied heavily on
City of Canton v. Harris,489 U.S. 378 (1989) (establishing the deliberate indifference
standard for determining whether a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for a
failure to train its officials).
131 Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 725.
132

D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir.

1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993).
133

See id.

804

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:3

port, or created or exacerbated the danger posed by the student defendants.' 4
Out of the Fourth Circuit arose the case of B.M.H. v. School Board.35
The court found the Chesapeake, Virginia, school had no duty to protect an
eighth grade student from rape by a fellow classmate, even where, as here,
the school had prior notice from the eighth grader that she had been threatened. 3 6 The district court, basing its holding on the restraint-on-liberty rationale, concluded that custody did not exist.'37
A different-but in today's society highly relevant-scenario arose in
Maldonado v. Josey.38 The Tenth Circuit, effectively rejecting the concept
of functional custody first discussed in Stoneking I, found no duty to protect
an elementary student who choked to death while left unattended for twenty
minutes in a cloakroom.'39 Already in 1990, the Seventh Circuit had held
that Illinois school authorities did not have an affirmative duty under the
Due Process Clause to prevent alleged sexual abuse of school children by a
teacher. 4 Absent a showing that the manner in which the state exercised
its power over the children rendered them incapable of caring for themselves, no duty arose.' 4'
For a time, the Fifth Circuit appeared to be the first of the circuits to
break away from the no-duty-to-protect rule.' In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District (Doe J),143 the Fifth Circuit held that "school officials

134 See

id. Chief Judge Sloviter's dissent rose above the en banc decision. Chief

Judge Sloviter invoked the specter of the language in Stoneking I and Stoneking II,
stating that nothing in DeShaney precluded a functional custody analysis. Chief Judge
Sloviter also argued forcefully on several other points, namely that the Court in
DeShaney had stated:
[A] duty to protect can arise from the "State's affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty .

.

.

"

The Court did not

say "other similar types of custody," which it could easily have done if it had so
meant. Involuntary custody is just one type of "limitation which [the State can]
impose[] on [an individual's] freedom to act on his own behalf."
Id. at 1379 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201) (citations
omitted). Chief Judge Sloviter's observations, once again both principled and perceptive, point to yet another ambiguity created as a result of the DeShaney decision. See
supra Part II.C. and accompanying notes.
135 833 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1993).

138

See id. at 562.
id.
975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 914 (1993).

139

See id.

136

137 See

140 See
141
142
143

J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990).
See id.
See Horwitz, supra note 84, at 1224-25.
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) (Doe 1), cert. de-
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have a constitutional duty to protect schoolchildren from known or reasonably foreseeable harms occurring during or in connection with school activities."' 44 Doe I involved sexual harassment perpetrated against a student by
her biology teacher as opposed to a fellow student. At the time, this case
gave hope to some commentators that the monolithic no-duty-to-protect rule
might not endure. 45 Upon rehearing the case in Doe II, however, the court
limited its findings to the facts, thus effectively extinguishing the inference
that a duty to protect from third parties, especially fellow students, might be
found.'46 The Fifth Circuit later confirmed this restricted reading of Doe II
in 1994.141 In so confirming, the Fifth Circuit held in Leffall v. Dallas Independent School Districtthat a school was not liable when one student shot
another at a school dance. 41 Yet again, however, the circuit court vacillated, stating:
[W]e need not go so far as have some of our sister circuits
and conclude that no special relationship can ever exist between an ordinary public school district and its students; we
conclude- only that no such relationship exists during a
school sponsored dance held outside of the time during
which students are required to attend school for non-volun49
tary activities.
Despite the Fifth Circuit's partial break with the no-duty rule and ambiguities found in other circuits, the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits have refused to recognize a broad duty to protect in
the school setting. 5

nied, 506 U.S. 980 (1993), vacated, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Doe I),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994).
144 Id. at 144.
145 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 84, at 1224-25.
146 See Doe II, 15 F.3d at 457 n.12.
"" See Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
no special relationship existed between a school district and a parent, and that state
actors were not deliberately indifferent to a student's constitutional rights).
141 See id.; see also supra Introduction, Scenario One.
149 Leffall, 28 F.3d at 529.
"o See Faberman, supra note 51, at 114. This presumption by Faberman reinforces
the position of his argument, which is discussed in Part IV. As Part III.B also shows,
ambiguities exist in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. Moreover, these are not mere
ambiguities of language, but indicate judicial concern for denying recovery under
§ 1983 in even the most egregious cases of constitutional violation: namely, when disabled or very young students are abused at public residential schools. To support his
assertion, Faberman cites, for example, Stauffer v. Orangeville School District, 1990
WL 304250 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1990), as a case in which a federal district court in the
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B. Cases Directly or Nearly On Point and the Exceptions to the No-Duty
Rule
1. Cases Directly or Nearly on Point
Despite the consensus among the circuits that public day schools generally have no duty to protect their students, the narrow issue of whether
residential schools have a duty to protect their disabled students recurrently
resurfaces in the courts. The case of Stevens v. Umsted,"' perhaps an otherwise unremarkable district court decision, illustrates this recurrence. It also
may illustrate the media's and the public's interest in its implications.
In Stevens, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's § 1983 suit because
it found that the residential school's level of custody over the severely visually impaired and developmentally disabled plaintiff, Bradley Stevens, was
not sufficient for the court to recognize Bradley's underlying constitutional
due process rights "to be secure in his person and to be placed in a safe
environment free from ... sexual assaults." ' Bradley, today nineteen, entered the residential school at the age of nine." 3 Over a span of ten years,
fellow students sexually abused him despite the superintendent's alleged
notice of some of the prior abuse.' 54
District Court Judge Richard Mills acknowledged that, in the Seventh
Circuit at least, the level of custody was not alone measured according to
He
the voluntariness or involuntariness of the custodial relationship.'
said, moreover, that if the duty to protect were to exist, it nevertheless
would be so novel as to entitle the superintendent to qualified immunity.' 56
In a final footnote, a further, perhaps more revealing, concern appeared: "By
allowing this case to proceed, this Court would add to the list of individuals

Seventh Circuit held that no affirmative obligation to protect existed when a student
was sexually assaulted by other students. See Faberman, supra note 51, at 139 n.120.
As Part III.B reveals, this characterization is not altogether accurate.
151 921 F. Supp. 530, 535 (C.D. I1. 1996), aft'd, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997).
152 Id. at 531 (quoting the plaintiff's complaint). The circular logic, or rather illogic,
forced upon the district court by the very real ambiguities still felt in the wake of
DeShaney are analyzed in greater detail in Part V.
"' See id.
154 See id.
"' Whether this is so remains debatable, if not altogether doubtful. For an in-depth
analysis, see infra Part V.
156 See Stevens, 921 F. Supp. at 536-37. The court noted that when, as here, a plaintiff fails to specify whether a defendant is being sued in his official or individual capacity, the Seventh Circuit courts construe § 1983 claims as naming defendants in their
official capacities. Defendants named in their official capacities may escape liability
under the Eleventh Amendment. See supra Part II.D.1.
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' In its narrow interpretation, the
whom the states owe a duty to protect."157
Stevens court failed to recognize what another district court in the Seventh
Circuit, writing nearly six years before Stevens and just shortly after the
Supreme Court's DeShaney decision, acknowledged:

Although the State has no general duty to protect students
from ... third parties, this duty could conceivably be imposed under the facts of this specific case. By allowing
Stauffer [the plaintiff and a special education student] to go,
to the restroom unsupervised with another student who had a
prior history of sexually molesting others and who had
threatened Plaintiff, it is possible that the teacher placed
Stauffer in a hazardous situation. State actors are under a
duty to protect a person from the violence of others if they
themselves put the person in a position of danger .... Since
the plaintiff might fit within this exception to the general rule
that the State has no duty to protect students from the acts of
third parties,this court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss
the portion of the complaint dealing with the school's duty
of protection. 5
The district court in Stevens v. Umsted did recognize,' 59 however, that:
Id. at 536 n.11.
5 Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 304250, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 17,
1990) (citing Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)).
159The Stevens decision also referred to Spivey v. Elliot, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir.
1994), aftfd, 41 F.3d 1497 (11th Cir. 1995). In Spivey, the Eleventh Circuit originally
had held that a residential student had a special relationship with the state, potentially
triggering a constitutional duty to protect the student. Because the constitutional right
was not clearly established at the time of the act, however, as per the qualified immunity inquiry, defendants escaped liability. This was potentially groundbreaking because the
Eleventh Circuit's finding of such a duty could have been interpreted to have henceforth
established such a constitutional right. If the Eleventh Circuit were to have found such a
duty, then future defendants would not have been likely to have availed themselves of a
qualified immunity defense, for they might have been deemed to have known of a residential student's constitutional right to protection as a result of the Eleventh Circuit's
finding. Before this could occur, however, the court withdrew its decision sua sponte
because it thought "it [was] enough to decide that there was no clearly established
constitutional right allegedly violated by the defendants." Spivey, 41 F.3d at 1498. The
withdrawal might make some wonder whether the Eleventh Circuit indulged in a judicial technicality. The Eleventh Circuit soft-pedalled the issue:
This exercise is probably of more interest to the bench and bar for future cases
than to the parties in this particular case. Once there has been a determination that
there is no "clearly established" right, the parties can accomplish little in pursuing
the question of whether there is a right at all.
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"No court has yet held that a fulltime, residential student at a special staterun school has a constitutional right to a safe environment." The court went
on to note that the Fifth Circuit in Walton v. Alexander 60 was "the only
court to rule on the question [and] held that the superintendent of such a
school has no duty to protect."16'
That ruling in Walton is potentially open to constitutional challenge. 62
The nature of that challenge partly flows from the logic used by the Fifth
Circuit. The facts in Walton reveal that one student sexually assaulted another student who lived at a special state-run residential school for the deaf.'63
Although the court conceded that the state had curtailed the plaintiff's liberties, it said that the disabled plaintiff voluntarily was committed to the
school." Voluntariness thus became the sole linchpin of the court's reasoning, which denied the existence of a "special relationship," that is,
whether custody over the student arose by virtue of state action or inaction." Hence the Fifth Circuit found that the student's option166 to atId. This withdrawal, however, was not a technicality. Rather, if read carefully, the
above portion of Spivey effectively chills the recognition of any constitutional duties not
clearly announced from the time that DeShaney was announced. Hence, the impact of
the court's circular logic on § 1983 suits may well prove devastating. The circularity of
the decision's logic is discussed further in Part V.
'6 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
161Stevens, 921 F. Supp. at 535 (citations omitted) (citing Walton v. Alexander, 44
F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). But see Dorothy J.v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794
F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (holding there was no duty to protect a mentally handicapped student enrolled in a program teaching life and social skills, absent some affirmative action by the state such as custody, which, the court held, did not exist), affTd,
7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
'62Even the district court in Stevens v. Umsted said, "[T]he reasoning of the majority
in Walton has been discredited by the Seventh Circuit in Camp." 921 F. Supp. at 535
(citations omitted) (citing Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
"a child placed in the guardianship of the state has a due process right not to be placed
by the state with a custodian whom [sic] the state knows will fail to exercise the requisite degree of supervision over the child," 67 F.3d at 1294)). The district court in
Stevens went on to point out that Camp, among other decisions, "instructs that
voluntariness alone is not a sufficient basis to deny the existence of a duty to protect."
Stevens, 921 F. Supp. at 536; see supra Part II.A, and especially note 108.
163 See Walton, 44 F.3d at 1299-1300.
16 See id. at 1305. The court acknowledged that:
As a resident, Walton slept at the School and took his meals at the School. The
School strictly regulated when Walton could come and when he could go. Furthermore, the School severely restricted the conditions under which he could leave
the campus. For the most part, the School determined his daily schedule of duties,
classes, and activities when he was on campus ....The record will support the
factual contentions asserted by Walton.
Id. (emphasis added).
165 See id. at 1303-05.
16
Itmay well be argued, as has been done by some, that this "option" to attend or
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tend and later to leave the school militated against finding sufficient custody
for an underlying constitutional right and duty to attach under § 1983.167
To this end, the language of the Estelle-Youngberg-DeShaney cluster once
more was pressed into service to justify granting different constitutional
rights to involuntarily and voluntarily committed persons: "Referring to
Estelle and Youngberg, the [DeShaney] Court acknowledged that 'when the
State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safekeeping and general well-being."'168 To further buttress
its voluntariness test, the court even invoked its recent holding in
Leffall,'69 which stood for no more than that a school was not constitutionally liable when a student was randomly shot at a school-sponsored afterhours dance.170
Judge Parker's concurrence, while agreeing that no § 1983 liability
attached under Walton, nevertheless disagreed with the majority's reasoning. 71 Although he believed the § 1983 suit failed because the plaintiff did
not make a showing of deliberately indifferent conduct, Judge Parker disagreed with the conclusion that "absolutely no duty to residential students of
the Mississippi School for the Deaf' existed to provide them "at least some
That the
level of protection from assault by other students."'7
voluntariness of the restraint on liberty, which comprised the majority's
constitutional test, deprived Walton and other disabled students like him of
their constitutional rights struck Judge Parker as "arbitrary, illogical, and
formalistic."'7

In mitigating the absolute force of the Estelle-Youngberg-

DeShaney cases, Judge Parker argued that
The majority's holding that custody must be "involuntary"
and "against [a person's] will" is so restrictive that it precludes any type of custody short of incarceration or institutionalization giving rise to the duty of protection. In effect,
the majority has confined the duty of protection to the circumstances found in Estelle and Youngberg. Such a narrow

leave a residential school for the disabled is nothing more than a de jure option, a formality. Upon reflection, this argument is but a clear conceptual extension of the
voluntariness and involuntariness debate. See supra Part II.A.
167

See Walton, 44 F.3d at 1305.

'6
Id. at 1303 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489
U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989)).
169 Dallas v. Leffall Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994).

170

See Walton, 44 F.3d at 1304.

171 See
172

id. at 1307 (Parker, J., concurring specially).

Id. (Parker, J., concurring specially).

"' Id. at 1306 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
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application of this duty clearly was not contemplated in
DeShaney.74

Judge Parker quoted the ambiguous language in DeShaney to rebut the
sweeping effect of the majority's narrow reading of that case:
The precise type of restraint that will create a corresponding
affirmative duty was not spelled-out in DeShaney, but 'it
seems clear that "similar restraint of personal liberty" means
that there may be circumstances other than those in Estelle
and Youngberg that give rise to a constitutional duty to pro-

tect. 75
To refute the majority's characterization of the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Leffall as controlling Walton, Judge Parker wrote that because Leffall did
not pertain to a school for the disabled with twenty-four-hour custody of its
students, it did not involve the same, presumably high, level of custodial
control found in Walton.1 76
The concurrence also criticized the very heart of the voluntariness test:

"Rather than simply asking whether a person entered state custody 'voluntarily,' we should examine the nature of the custodial relationship that existed between the State and the plaintiff."'" Finally, Judge Parker proposed
that instead of testing the voluntariness of the custodial relationship, several

174 Id.

at 1308 (Parker, J., concurring specially).

Id. at 1307-08 (Parker, J., concurring specially) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). Judge Parker also quoted
Graham Independent School District No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1994):
"Nonetheless, DeShaney left undefined the precise measure of a state restraint that
engenders an individuals [sic] right to claim a corresponding affirmative duty." Id. at
1308 n.10 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
176 See id. at 1308 (Parker, J., concurring specially) (citing Leffall v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1994)).
" Id. at 1309 (Parker, J., concurring specially). Judge Parker then quoted and cited
several commentators who "have been critical of 'involuntariness' as a threshold requirement in the context of custodial control exercised in public schools." Id. (Parker,
J., concurring specially). One commentator whom Judge Parker quoted wrote:
Any insistence that a legal compulsion to attend school be present before an affirmative duty to protect is recognized would result in the drawing of irrational and
arbitrary classifications defining the circumstances and situations in which students are afforded constitutional protection. The key to the duty owed should be
the state's assumption of responsibility for the care and control of students while
they are physically present in a state-created and controlled environment.
Id. (Parker, J. concurring specially) (quoting Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody,
Creation of Danger,and Culpability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 435, 450 (1994)).
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factors should be taken into account in determining whether sufficient custody exists to show state action or inaction when establishing whether an
underlying constitutional right arises at all:
(1) "the authority and discretion state actors have to control the environment and the behavior of the individuals in their custody,"'78
(2) "the responsibilities assumed by the State,"' 79
(3) "the extent to which an individual in state custody must rely on the
State to provide for his or her basic needs," ' and
(4) "the degree of control actually exercised by the State in a given
situation.'..
2. The True, but Broad-Based,Exceptions

Courts in the Second Circuit proved themselves willing to impose upon
schools a duty to protect students when the theory for finding a constitutional right and deliberate indifference can be proven. 2 The district court
in Pagano v. MassapequaPublic Schools, for example, found that a duty to

protect was established, under § 1983, upon an elementary school student's
allegation of seventeen incidents of physical and verbal abuse by other students, of which school officials allegedly knew and failed to prevent.8 3
The plaintiff's claim was based on a theory of the school's customs, policies, and practices."8' The district court thus recognized that a claim for
state action or inaction under § 1983 had been established.8 5
Most significantly, Chief Judge Platt acknowledged the analogy to the
prisoner and state institutionalized patients scenarios drawn by the
plaintiff.'86 In moving on to analyze whether an underlying constitutional
right existed, Chief Judge Platt, noting the ruling in DeShaney announced
that very year, drew a distinction between Pagano's situation and

Id. (Parker, J., concurring specially). Note the common law tort-duty flavor of
Judge Parker's factors for establishing custody.
179 Id. at 1309-10 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
Id. at 1310 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
181 Id. (Parker, J., concurring specially).
182 See Robert G. v. Newburgh City Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 3210 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
1990) (denying a motion to dismiss a female student's claim against school officials
based on a sexual assault perpetrated by a substitute teacher); Pagano v. Massapequa
Public Schs., 714 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying a motion to dismiss a
student's claim against school officials based on a series of physical and verbal assaults
by other students).
183 See Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 642.
184 See id. at 642-43 (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690 (1978)).
185 See id.
186

See id&at 643.
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DeShaney's.'87 In doing so, Chief Judge Platt focused on the well-known
8 s Stating that the Second
foster home footnote in DeShaney."
Circuit held
that a duty existed in the foster home situation,'89 Chief Judge Platt went
on to say: "The facts of the present case [Pagano], on the face of the complaint, appear to be closer to those of Doe than DeShaney in that the victim
and the perpetrator(s) were under the care of the school in its parenspatriae
capacity at the time these alleged incidents occurred."''
As for the standard of liability, the Paganocourt accepted that seventeen
alleged incidents of repeated negligence may rise to the level of deliberate
indifference.' The plaintiff, therefore, had "stated a sufficient claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 at this juncture to withstand a motion to dismiss."' 92
Later that same year, another New York district court likewise denied a
defendant's motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim. 3 In Robert G. v.
Newburgh City School District,the plaintiff's daughter allegedly was sexually assaulted by a substitute teacher on school grounds during school
hours. 1
Relying heavily on the "functional custody" language in
Stoneking I,195 the district court stated that New York recognized the "custodial control by the Board of Education of its students."' 96 Justifying the
1.7See
1..

id.
See id. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Sen's., 489 U.S.

189, 201 n.9 (1989)).
89 See id. (citing Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.
1981). after remand, 709 F.2d 782 (2.d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S 864 (1983)).

" Id. It is noteworthy that Chief Judge Platt focused on both the victim's and the
alleged perpetrator's relationships to the school. Also noteworthy is the fact that New
York courts recognize a school's duty to protect. See, e.g., Pratt v. Robinson, 349
N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that a school's physical custody over its students
creates a duty to protect); Logan v. City of New York, 543 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (App.
Div. 1989) (recognizing that the board of education had a duty to protect its students by
virtue of its physical custody over them). The court in Stauffer did not accept the sweep
of the Pagano decision, noting:
This court, however, does not find the reasoning in Pagano persuasive. Although
the State requires children to attend school, this does not create a deprivation of
liberty similar to that imposed on prisoners or persons who are involuntarily committed to a State institution. If this were the case then every time a school child is
assaulted by the class bully during recess there would be a tort of constitutional
dimensions under § 1983.
Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 304250, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1990).
'91See Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643.
192 Id.

at 644.

" See Robert G. v. Newburgh City Sch. Dist., 1990 WL 3210 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
1990).
194 See id. at *1.
195 Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988)
(Stoneking 1), vacated sub nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062 (1988).
'" Robert G., 1990 WL 3210, at *3 n.1 (citing cases). See, e.g., Pratt v. Robinson,
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soundness of the plaintiff's theory for establishing an underlying constitutional right even against the backdrop of DeShaney, the court, quoting
Stoneking II, noted: "Nothing in DeShaney suggests that state officials may
escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates."'" In addition, the court allowed the parties to conduct discovery."'
Despite these exceptions and the consternation evident in cases that have
found that residential schools had no constitutional duty toward their disabled students, the general no-duty rule remains intact. Thus far, the commentators generally disagree with the reasoning of the courts. It is to their
views that the present study will now briefly turn.
IV. THE COMMENTATORS CLOSE RANKS-ALMOST
The commentators who have addressed whether schools should have a
broad duty to protect students almost completely agree that such a duty
should be imposed on public schools. Steven Huefner, whose oft-cited work
analyzed the duty of public schools to protect their students in the aftermath
of DeShaney, argued early on for the courts to allow "noncustodial" theories
to establish the kind of state action or inaction that could lead to judicial
recognition of an underlying constitutional right to protection.' Huefner
also reasoned that given the increasingly important role that schools play in
student lives, and given the mandatory attendance and in loco parentis laws,
the student-school relationship should be considered sufficiently custodial, at
least during the time students are in attendance, for purposes of recognizing
a constitutional duty to protect.2°°
John W. Walters developed a "sufficient custody" test for determining
0 Taking into account factors such as a
when the duty should be imposed.2
particular child's needs and the extent of control exerted over that child, the
"test," by measuring the combination of these variables along a continuum,
the "Range of School Custody line," would then apply the factors against a

349 NE.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that a school's physical custody over its
students creates a duty to protect); Logan v. City of New York, 543 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663
(App. Div. 1989) (recognizing that the board of education had a duty to protect its
students by virtue of its physical custody over them).
19 Id. at *2 (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d
Cir. 1989) (Stoneking If), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990)).
'9'See id. at *3.
'9 See Huefner, supra note 103, at 1960-65.
See id. at 1967.
2o1 See John W. Walters, Note, The ConstitutionalDuty of Teachers to Protect Students: Employing the "Sufficient Custody" Test, 83 KY. L.J. 229 (1995). The test, like
Walters's analysis, recognizes that the DeShaney decision ultimately rested upon a restraint-on-liberty rationale, not on notions of voluntariness or involuntariness.
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standard benchmark, the "Constitutional Duty line," which, depending upon
the resultant school setting, either would or would not impose a duty to protect. 20 Walters conceded that under his model a court would first assume
the existence of a duty-as represented graphically by the "Constitutional
Duty line"--and then work its way backward.2 3 The resulting analysis
thus focuses upon whether the "teacher's conduct was grossly negligent or
completely indifferent."" ° Once liability was found to attach under the
test, a jury given the claim could measure whether the school deviated from
the reasonable standard of custody.2 5
Barbara L. Horwitz's comment also favors establishing a broad public
school duty to protect.? Horwitz made two especially principled arguments: (1) that as its ultimate purpose § 1983 was meant to protect individuals from governmental abuse of their constitutional rights,' 7 and (2) that
among some of the alternatives to suits based on § 1983 lurked potential
Title IX actions alleging sexual abuse and harassment.2 "9 Although
Horwitz, like many others, overestimated the Fifth Circuit's willingness to
create a broad duty to protect in Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,2 she did predict the contemporary shift toward Title IX suits, which
are increasingly brought to "pressure school districts into controlling the
210
actions of their employees.
Although most commentators favor the blanket imposition on schools of
a general duty to protect their students, 1 Michael Gilbert argued for a

See id. at 256-57.
3 See id. at 256-58.
2 Id. at 257-58.
2 See id at 263.
202

See Horwitz, supra note 84.

2 See id at 1225.
2o See id. at 1221-22.
975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) (Doe 1), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1087 (1993), vacated, 14 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Doe I), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994).
210 Horwitz, supra note 84, at 1222; see also Doe 1, 975 F.2d at 138-39 (holding that
a school official is liable for the violation of a student's rights by a school employee
only when the student demonstrates that the official by action or inaction was deliberately indifferent to the student's constitutional rights); supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
21 Other commentators who favor imposing the duty on schools include Karen M.
Davis, Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a ConstitutionalRemedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 IND. L.J. 1123 (1994); Adam M.
Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun "Cause Help Ain't Comin": The Need for ConstitutionalProtectionfrom PeerAbuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE L.J. 588 (1993); and
Susanna M. Kim, Comment, Section 1983 Liability in the Public Schools After
DeShaney: The "Special Relationship" Between School and Student, 41 UCLA L. REV.

1101 (1994).

1998]

AND WHAT OF THE MEEK?

'
"middle ground."212
Gilbert's proposed middle ground turned on the identity of the perpetrator who harmed the student: "[C]ourts should find an affirmative duty in the public school setting at least in cases of abuse or molestation by a teacher or school employee.""21 Summarizing his rationale, Gilbert stated:

A court which finds a duty in cases where a teacher or
school employee is the perpetrator of the abuse is not necessarily obligated to find that such a duty exists when a student is abused by a fellow student. The "all or nothing"
approach is not necessary. All of the public school abuse
cases are not the same. As noted, there is a significant difference, with regard to vulnerability and ability to seek assistance, between cases in which the perpetrator is a teacher or
school employee and cases in which the perpetrator is a
student.1
If Gilbert's position holds the middle ground for imposing a duty to
protect on public schools, Stephen Faberman broke from the apparent consensus altogether.215 Faberman, in effect, advocated a strict interpretation
of DeShaney, rejecting the functional custody analysis within the school setting. 216 Moreover, responding to Stephen Huefner's suggestion for a noncustodial duty analysis, Faberman argued that "even under a non-custodial
analysis, the state has not become so intertwined with one of its citizens'
lives, that it has assumed responsibility for ensuring that citizen's welfare
and protection."2 7 Writing without the aid of hindsight, Faberman partially

Gilbert, supra note 122.
Id. at 509.
214 Id.
215 See Faberman, supra note 51.
216 See id. at 127-31. Faberman does not ignore DeShaney's patent ambiguities, such
as the Court's "analogous" circumstances language and foster home footnote; rather, he
limits them to their narrowest linguistic constructions.
217 See id. at 130. On closer examination, Faberman's statement constitutes merely
a
further rejection of the functional custody analysis-not an argument that, by its own
force, undercuts Huefner's oft-quoted statement, which Faberman himself quotes, that
"[a] proper analysis should look to the implications of custodial control, rather than
only to the control itself, because it is the underlying dependency that actually obligates
the state to act, not the state's legal status as custodian." Id. at 124 (quoting Huefner,
212
213

supra note 103, at 1957).

In fairness to Faberman, however, Huefner's argument would

be better employed to dispel the arguably mistaken notion that due process rights, and
indeed DeShaney itself, turn on the voluntariness or involuntariness of the restraint of a
person's liberty. Part V attempts, through a conceptually independent approach, to dispel that notion.
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devoted his argument against the Fifth Circuit's then recent ruling in Doe
21
that "school officials have a constitutional duty to protect
schoolchildren from known or reasonably foreseeable harms occurring dur' The Fifth Circuit apparently
ing or in connection with school activities."219
shared Faberman's unease with such a sweeping rule establishing a public
school's duty to protect its students. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit vacated Doe
1,220 thus restoring the general no-duty rule in that circuit.
Perplexing, perhaps, is the question why commentators, as well as district and circuit court judges still discuss the troublesome issue of when, if
ever, students may hold a due process right not to be harmed at school. To
be sure, DeShaney's ambiguities continue to prove legally nettlesome, even
inconsistent, as a basis for a court's judgement under especially difficult factual circumstances. Could it be, then, that the most egregious cases, those
involving abuse at state residential schools for handicapped students, keep
alive the debate on an otherwise judicially stable, if not altogether sound,
pattern of decisions?
V.

RECOMMENDATION

The imposition of a duty on state residential schools to protect their

disabled students, thus recognizing a bright line exception to the general noduty rule, can be squared evenly under both existing Supreme Court case
law22' and any test measuring the amount of custody that may be exerted
by a state before a state's acts or omissions may be used to establish an
underlying due process right under § 19 83 .' Of course, that the duty may
be recognized constitutionally would not relieve a plaintiff from having to
introduce evidence upon which the duty may be based, nor would it relax
the standard of care; that is, a plaintiff must still, as per § 1983, show deliberate indifference on the part of the defendant.223

218

Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) (Doe 1), cert. de-

nied, 506 U.S. 1087 (1993), vacated, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), vacated, 15 F.3d
443 (5th Cir. 1994) (Doe I), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994).
219 Id. at 144.
2
15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Doe I), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994);
see also supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
-2 See supra Part II.
m See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 201-05 and
accompanying text (discussing John W. Walters's "sufficient custody" test).
' Anything less would allow ordinary negligence to assume "constitutional dimensions." See supra Part I.D.3.
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A. Satisfying the Threshold Tests: Balancing ConstitutionalEquities
Several tests have been proposed in trying to measure the necessary
amount of a state's custody over a person, before a state constitutionally is
required ex post to act or refrain from acting." Under Judge Parker's test
in Walton, for example, four factors would be taken into account.2" Applying the test to the situation of a young, severely visually impaired and
developmentally disabled child bolsters the need for imposing a duty to
protect disabled students at residential schools.
First, for the sake of argument, it can be assumed that the authority and
discretion of the hypothetical state actor to control the environment and
behavior of disabled students in its care,226 though potentially varying from
institution to institution, usually is mandated by policy, custom, and practice,
if not state law. A measure of stability thus inheres in the analysis; however,
even under the least restrictive environment, the dangers and special needs
attendant to disabled students suggests that a residential school for the disabled would need a much greater degree of control over the students than
would the typical nonresidential public school for able-bodied students. The
facts of Walton, as the Fifth Circuit acknowledged, convincingly bear out
the high degree of supervision and control likely to exist at a residential
school for the disabled. 7
Second and third, the responsibilities of the state 2' for the students'
basic needs229 in a twenty-four hour residential setting assume comprehensive dimensions. Not only would the state be responsible for the students'
education, as it would in the typical nonresidential public school, but in
effect it would feed, supervise, and house the disabled children each day
See supra notes 178-81, 201-05, and accompanying text.
See Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Park-

er, J., concurring specially). Judge Parker suggested that rather than consider whether a
person was taken into custody voluntarily, the court should determine whether a "special relationship" exists based on
(1) the authority and discretion state actors have to control the environment and
the behavior of the individuals in their custody, (2) the responsibilities assumed
by the State, (3) the extent to which an individual in state custody must rely on
the State to provide for his or her basic needs, and (4) the degree of control actu-

ally exercised by the State in a given situation.
Id.
2

Judge Parker referred to "custody." As employed, the word "care" is meant to

convey the same meaning as "custody." "Care" is used instead of "custody" to distinguish between the degrees of possible custody-custody falling short of constitutionally
cognizable custody and custody rising to the level necessary to establish an underlying
constitutional right.
227 See Walton, 44 F.3d at 1299.
See id. at 1309-10 (Parker, J., concurring specially).
229 See id. (Parker, J., concurring specially).
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and night. Such a relationship assumes both the conceptual and practical
contours of full-blown institutionalization.
Fourth, the degree of control actually exercised23 ° by the state in a given situation flows nearly directly from the determinations under factors one
through three. This fourth factor, however, is not extraneous. Rather, its appropriate role would be to pierce the veil of the de jure custody exerted by
the residential school over its disabled student. This inquiry draws on the
very foundations of an equitable analysis potentially reaching constitutional
dimensions. In a suit in which a defendant school has some measure of
motive to discount its official custodial relationship with a student, factor
four enables a court to focus on the de facto quantum of custody exerted.
In applying John W. Walters's "sufficient custody" test,23 if a disabled
plaintiff residing at a residential school were to adequately allege deliberate
indifference on the part of the defendant, she seemingly would be entitled to
have a duty to protect automatically imposed on the school. If this were not
the case, Walters's constitutional duty analysis, even upon a showing of a
defendant's deliberate indifference, would deny a fortiori the duty to all
able-bodied students in typical nonresidential school settings. That result
effectively could deprive the test of its potency altogether.
Upon applying these tests, it becomes clear that residential schools for
the disabled manifest the requisite quantum of custody for a state's action or
inaction to give rise to an underlying due process right of protection. Although tests measuring the sufficiency of custody address the equities and
circumstances on a case-by-case basis, such tests partially undermine the
certainty that students, as well as school administrators and teachers, presumably would rely upon in conducting their relations. Absent certainty that
a duty to protect disabled students at residential schools exists, the net impact on such § 1983 claims merely would be more suits232 and, perhaps
not surprisingly, a more confused body of case law.
Most importantly, once case law sacrifices certainty within the § 1983
setting, both qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity potentially shatter the already brittle efficacy of § 1983 in its role of redressing
constitutional violations. That judicial uncertainty under a case-by-case
analysis would expand the already arguably exaggerated aegis of qualified
immunity also exposes the circularity of the objective test for immunity.23 3

230

See id. at 1310 (Parker, J., concurring specially).

2' See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.

The reason that more suits would be brought stems from the judicial case-by-case
test plaintiffs would face as a threshold determination of whether a duty may be recognized. Once plaintiffs were to believe that their cases differed factually, even if only
232

slightly, from past decisions that led to dismissal, they might risk the costs of bringing

suit.
" This circularity, in the context of Stevens, is discussed below. See infra Part
V.B.1.
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If, for instance, a duty could not be established with certainty-and a caseby-case constitutional test applied by different district and circuit courts
would make confusion and uncertainty a real possibility if not an eventuality-w-then schools and their officials, invoking qualified immunity's objective knowledge test, would escape liability under more compelling circumstances than those upon which they escape today. Rather than rely on tests
measuring the equities behind custodial relationships out of a theoretical
regard for a case-by-case analysis, to provide disabled students at residential
schools with real remedies for the constitutional violations of their rights,
one needs only to penetrate the narrow, and often confused, interpretations
of already existing case law.
B. Broadening the Conceptual Consequences of DeShaney
1. The Restraint-on-LibertyRationale: Remembrance or Reminiscence?

Courts almost universally hold that schools have no duty to protect their
students based on the prevailing narrow interpretation of DeShaney's23
conceptual mooring.235 Even when disabled students are abused under deliberately indifferent conditions at twenty-four-hour residential schools,
courts invoke a cramped characterization of DeShaney.236 By their narrow
judicial construction, courts have elevated DeShaney's ambiguities237 to the
near demise of its underlying conceptual underpinning: the restraint-on-liberty rationale.23 Restoring the centrality of the restraint-on-liberty rationale
would permit the recognition of a constitutional duty to protect disabled
students at residential schools under the Fourteenth Amendment, enforceable
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3
The language in DeShaney itself creates the ambiguities upon which the
courts have based their narrow no-duty interpretation.24 The two lines
along which courts have refused to recognize a duty to protect directly follow the patent "foster home" ambiguity and the latent "voluntariness" ambi-

Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2 See supra Part III.A.
236 See Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding
14

that absent a "special relationship," nothing in the Due Process Clause requires a state
to protect its citizens from violence at the hands of private actors); Stevens v. Umsted,
921 F. Supp. 530, 532 (C.D. I11.
1996) (holding that a person has no constitutional right
to have the government protect him from injuries caused by private actors), aff'd, 131
F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997).
2 See supra Part II.C.
238 See generally supra Part II.

2 See infra Part V.B.
240

See supra Part III.A.
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guity. In Stevens, for example, the district court's narrow construction of
DeShaney was manifest: "By allowing this case to proceed, this Court
would add to the list of individuals whom states owe a duty to protect." 241
The court thus construed DeShaney narrowly, interpreting it to recognize
only three situations in which a duty to protect might arise: incarceration,
institutionalization, and the foster home setting. 1 2 The Eleventh Circuit in
Spivey v. Elliot243 likewise refused, by narrowly interpreting DeShaney, to
find a duty to protect within a residential school setting.
Even if the narrowest possible construction in a case full of ambiguity is
most preferable, circularity in logic is not. The circularity in both Stevens
and Spivey, manifest as they are, may be depicted by a simplified syllogism:
No constitutional right because no recognized duty,
No recognized duty because no constitutional right,
Therefore, because no right and no duty, no § 1983 liability.
Apart from being riven with fallacy, the argument, as its conclusion shows,
is more than merely illogical: Because this argument actually is advanced by
courts, it ex ante deprives plaintiffs recovery under § 1983. It is doubly
illogical because, as the Stevens court said, the "duty that Plaintiff's claim
existed is so novel that, if the Court found it to exist, Umsted [the defendant] would be entitled to qualified immunity. 244
It is clear that qualified immunity bars "novel" suits; that is, if an official sued in his individual capacity 5 could not objectively have known at
the time of the alleged state action or inaction that he was under a particular
constitutional duty, he would be insulated from liability. 6 By employing
the logic depicted above, courts not only perpetuate antiquated concepts of
duty but, as a result, they also chill ex ante the long-standing constitutional
right: to redress alleged violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Preserving the artifice of the "novelty" of a claim regardless of the
frequency with which it is brought can only arrest society's notions of due
process. Furthermore, the Supreme Court could not have intended by its
247 perpetually to deny recognition of condecision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald
stitutional rights. Under the present conceptual regime of qualified immunity, combined with disregard for DeShaney's underlying restraint-on-liberty
rationale (and reliance instead upon that case's ambiguities), the courts in
effect prevent a claim's "novelty" from ever dissipating.

241 Stevens,

921 F. Supp. at 537 n.11.

242 See id. at 534-36.
243 29 F.3d 1522 (11th
244
245
246
247

Cir. 1994), afftd, 41 F.3d 1497 (11th Cir. 1995).
Stevens, 921 F. Supp. at 537.
See supra Part II.D.1.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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The Fifth Circuit's decision in Walton" s at least identified that
DeShaney's underpinning lay in the restraint-on-liberty (or "deprivation of
liberty") rationale. 9 Not unlike the district court in Stevens, however, the
Fifth Circuit in Walton (1) narrowly interpreted DeShaney's conceptual
foundation-the restraint-on-liberty rationale, 2 ° and (2) instead based its
refusal to find a duty to protect a disabled student at a residential school
upon the latent ambiguity (exemplified by Estelle" 2 and Youngberge2 ) of
whether "voluntariness" is a sine qua non for recognizing a duty. Indeed,
voluntariness became the focus of the Walton case. 3 Because the disabled
plaintiff voluntarily lived at the special residential school for the deaf, the
court found an iiisufficient custodial relationship to recognize the school's
duty to protect the student.l 4 In its analysis, the court therefore compressed voluntariness and the quantum of custody into a single inquiry. Its
approach, like the one taken by the Stevens court, lacks logical luster.
If one were only to look to the narrowest reading of DeShaney, as the
Walton court did, one would be left with a duty to protect under Estelle,
Youngberg, or circumstances of "other similar restraint of personal liberty, "255 such as certain foster care situations. Assuming arguendo that one
could overlook DeShaney's many ambiguities and relegate the Estelle and
Youngberg holdings to their narrowest consequences, the result is that only
three situations yield the kind of custody that gives rise to an underlying
constitutional due process right: (1) incarceration, (2) involuntary mental
institutionalization, and (3) "other similar restraint of personal liberty." Situations (1) and (2) create a kind of model custody, or Constitutional Custody.
Any factual situation hoping to qualify under proposition (3), therefore,
must approximate as closely as possible this Constitutional Custody.
Now, the question becomes painfully obvious, if not irrepressible: Can
this be done if custody was in any way voluntary? Concededly, perhaps
not. The better question to ask, however, is whether the inquiry into
voluntariness is logically necessary. It is not, unless one reads the EstelleYoungberg-DeShaney cases so narrowly as to forget their theoretical and

248

Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995); see also supra Part III.A and

accompanying notes.
249 See Walton, 44 F.3d at 1303. In citing DeShaney, the Fifth Circuit summarized
DeShaney's principal rationale: "This duty to protect, the Court found, arises not because of the state's knowledge of the individual's situation, but from the limitation the
state imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf." Id. (citing Deshaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
250See id. at 1297; see also supra Part III.A.
2' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), see also supra Part III.B.1.
252 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
253See Walton, 44 F.3d at 1302.
254See

id.

" Id. at 1303 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
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legal foundation: the restraint-on-liberty rationale. How can the restraint-onliberty rationale, the very nucleus of the Estelle-Youngberg-DeShaney cases,
discard the voluntariness inquiry altogether? One only needs to remember,
once more, the underlying conceptual rationale for situations (1) and (2)
namely, the Estelle and Youngberg decisions. Even read as narrowly as
possible, both cases turn on the restraint-on-liberty rationale, which the
Court calls a "deprivation of liberty." 6 That the rationale is not called the
"compulsion rationale" nor the "compulsion-leading-to-restraint-on-liberty"
rationale (nor the "compulsion-leading-to-the-deprivation-of-liberty rationale") theoretically vindicates those who insist that an incarcerated or involuntarily institutionalized citizen should be afforded greater rights than those
who were incarcerated or voluntarily institutionalized (even if "voluntarily"
meant merely formally or officially). For the sake of linguistic completeness,
one could argue that restraint or deprivation inherently connotes a sense of
involuntariness. Thus, to narrowly equate "proposition (3) custody" with
"proposition (1) and (2) custody" (or Constitutional Custody) is tautologically to argue that the restraint-on-liberty rationale may only be recognized
when an element of involuntariness arises. Such an argument might suffice
if restraint, absent involuntariness, lost its meaning altogether.
Not all courts, however, recognize the voluntariness argument 7" Still,
a simple example suffices to belie the argument for an involuntariness requirement. One might imagine a scenario in which a state picks up a mentally diseased vagabond out of his usual alley and institutionalizes him without official consent (but, say, with the vagabond's secret subjective approval). In this scenario, the vagabond would possess all the constitutional
protections arising from involuntary institutionalization. If one then pictures
that same vagabond voluntarily walking into the same state hospital, on the
very morning an order for his confinement was issued, but before it could
be carried out (the vagabond being all the while subjectively averse to his

256

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.

2 See Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113, 119 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Nothing
in the [DeShaney] Court's rationale for finding that some affirmative duty arises once
the state takes custody of an individual can be read to imply that the existence of the
duty somehow turns on the reason for taking custody."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906
(1991); Stevens v. Umstead, 921 F. Supp. 530, 534 (C.D. II1. 1996) ("Since DeShaney,
lower courts have differed in approach and result in a variety of cases. The courts generally agree that public schools are not liable for injuries to one student caused by another. The courts disagree, however, whether states are liable for injuries caused to
voluntary state mental patients.") (citations omitted); Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359,
378 (N.D. II1. 1985) ("[W]hile the court need not consider the constitutional significance of a voluntary admission on this motion, there is much logic in the cases that
find voluntary and involuntary residents entitled to the same constitutional rights to a
safe environment.") (emphasis added).
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new surroundings), one is hard pressed to explain why his constitutional.,
rights should now be ignored more casually.
Conversely, what about the voluntariness behind the government's action? Situations can be imagined in which state institutions and individuals
act officially, under the imposition of judicial decree or automatic administrative process, but not by preference. On such facts would it lie in the
state's mouth to deny it owed a constitutional duty? If so, individual constitutional rights would turn on a state's subjective representations. This prospect might be difficult to imagine, and easy to dismiss, in the case of an
administrative agency, but less so with a teacher.
Sole reliance on the patent and latent ambiguities of DeShaney to justify
reading this case narrowly inflicts even greater damage upon constitutionally
recognized doctrine. Because of their focus on whether incarceration and
involuntary mental institutionalization lead to sufficient custody, courts
potentially have and will continue to ignore other theories that have led, and
could still lead, to the recognition of an underlying constitutional right. To
exult custody as the only theory that could lead to success in a § 1983 suit
would imply that other judicially recognized theories-such as failure to
control a state official,2 8 creation of danger, 9 and deliberately indifferent custom, practice, and policy26 -amount to nothing more than blunderbuss approaches for pursuing a § 1983 suit. To give full effect to all judicially recognized theories under.§ 1983, the courts would do well to remember that at the heart of Estelle, Youngberg, and DeShaney lies the restrainton-liberty rationale and that custody is but one theory through which a constitutionally cognizable restraint on liberty may be recognized.
2. Policy Perspectives

It has been argued with some force that today § 1983 is largely a judicial construct."6 Courts have proved themselves unwilling to recognize a
student's due process right to be protected by his school, even when that
student is severely disabled and resides at his school day and night. 2
Courts thus have cast into doubt the efficacy, if not the availability, of
§ 1983 suits, even when deliberately indifferent state action or inaction can
be proven.

258

See supra Part I.D.2.

2 See supra Part I.D.2; D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972
F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993).
260 See supra Part I.D.2.; Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d. 720 (3d
Cir. 1989) (Stoneking I), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
261 See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 24, at 760.
262 See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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The stigma attached to § 1983 by the courts cannot easily be reconciled
with judicial permissiveness elsewhere. In the wake of Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Schools,' 3 for example, courts increasingly have awarded monetary damages against schools in suits brought under Title IX.' In addition, the Violence Against Women Act 5 of 1994 created a right to civil
damage remedies in federal court for gender-motivated abuse of women,
even when the abuser is not a state actor.266 If the broad spectrum of students may recover against schools under Title IX, disabled students at residential schools ought to be allowed similar recovery under § 1983.
Fears that every state tort would be turned into an alleged constitutional
violation would be put to rest by a principled, narrow definition of the duty
to protect. In addition, in a political climate contemplating subsidized school
vouchers, state tort law may soon prove difficult to apply. What is more, the
requisite high standard of care under § 1983, coupled with a duty applicable
only to the disabled in residential schools, would distinguish more clearly
the line between state tort concepts and wrongs reaching constitutional dimensions.
A damage remedy often is the only remedy for an abused disabled child
capable of proving deliberately indifferent conduct on the part of a residential state school. Because disabled students are the least able to make
known, or extricate themselves from,267 dangerous situations at residential
schools, upon the constitutional equities a bright line exception to the general no-duty rule would provide abused disabled students with monetary relief.
A confined constitutional duty to protect the disabled in a residential school
setting would promote the principle that due process does not demand a
two-dimensional constitutional inquiry--either a duty for all, or none.
In broad, practical terms, by devising the proposed constitutional duty
the courts not only would provide relief to those students already harmed by
abuses, but the courts also would deter future acts of violence against the
disabled. Deterrence would result from the threat of damages; and what
creates deterrence today leads to outright reforms in the future. It may be
argued that reforms cost money, but so, too, does the determined, and understandably repetitive, litigation often brought by parents of abused disabled children. In establishing a clear-cut exception to the no-duty rule, in
effect establishing a duty to protect, schools would be put on notice that
263

503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (holding that damage remedies are available for actions

brought to enforce Title IX).

264 See, e.g., Savage, supra note 7.
265 42 U.S.C. §§ 13981-14040 (1994).
266 See id.
267 See Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987).

If a reluctance to disclose has been found in fully able-bodied children, an even more
profound frustration may well be borne by the disabled child who is dependent upon the
state for his every need.
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questionably inclined teachers, employees or students, absent the institution
of appropriate safety or monitoring measures, could cost the school dearly.
Such ex ante knowledge also would enable schools to procure insurance. As
a result of the duty and its deterrence, parents and students would benefit
from safer, healthier lives, which in turn would reduce expenses for potential medical, psychological, or homecare treatment, as well as obviate the
doubly traumatic prospect of suffering abuse without adequate redress-a
cost borne not only by parents, but by society as well.
VI. CONCLUSION

A constitutionally recognized duty to protect the disabled at state residential schools is the most factually tenable, and least judicially expansive,
solution to the dilemma of whether to allow § 1983 remedies for harms
caused by a state's deliberately indifferent acts or omissions. Under a meritorious claim, the proposed duty would allow recovery for those least able
to protect themselves in a residential school setting, all the while preserving
the general no-duty rule that limits any would-be proliferation of constitutional remedies in other, more universal school settings. Recognition of the
proposed duty would, therefore, not only provide relief but also promote
deterrence.
Disabled students at state residential schools satisfy any constitutionally
sound test measuring custody. In addition, DeShaney's ambiguities should
not be relied upon to dismiss, as blunderbuss bases for recovery, other recognized theories that establish constitutional rights under § 1983. To effectively protect such constitutional rights is to recognize further that the policy
considerations undergirding the doctrine of qualified immunity ought not to
turn on the kind of circular logic and conceptual artifice that arrest society's
evolving notions of due process.
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